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GOOD NEWS CLUB V MILFORD CENTRAL
SCHOOL:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE




The right to Freedom of Speech', contained within the First
Amendment, allows every person to express personal beliefs on
government property characterized as a public forum.2 However,
the right to speak in a public forum is a qualified right. 3 As a
guarantee that citizens will have an equal opportunity to speak
* Candidate for J.D., St. John's University School of Law, June 2003; B.A., Marist College
2000.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech).
2 NORMAN REDLICH, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 431 (2d ed. 1999);
see Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(defining the various types of public forums). See generally Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia
Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining "the traditional public
forum is a place that historically has been devoted to the free exchange of views; streets
and parks are quintessential examples of traditional public fora"); Lee Rudy, Note, A
Procedural Approach to Limited Public Forum Cases, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1255, 1256-
63 (1995) (examining historical interpretation by Supreme Court of public forum
doctrine).
3 Perry Educ. Assn, 460 U.S. at 44 (stating "the existence of a right of access to
public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be
evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue"); see REDLICH, ET
AL., supra note 2, at 431 (arguing the "right of access is not absolute" and "lain unlimited
right of access to the public forum would jeopardize the First Amendment rights of
everyone."); see also Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (stating
"[wlhen the government creates a limited forum for speech, certain restrictions may be
necessary to define the limits and purposes of the program"); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (asserting "the First Amendment
does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
government").
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and be heard, the government may place limited restrictions on a
speaker's access to a public forum.4
The Establishment Clause, also contained within the First
Amendment, precludes the government from establishing any
one religion.5 The two primary theories of Establishment clause
jurisprudence disagree on the degree of state/religion
involvement that will result in a violation of this clause. 6 Those
who support the strict separation theory believe that government
should have absolutely no entanglement with religion.7 Those
who support some links between government and religion are
believers of the government accommodation theory.8
This all becomes much more confusing when the Court is faced
with a situation of religious speech in a public forum.
The Court's first ruling in the arena of public education came
in 1981 with Widmar v. Vincent.9 In Widmar, the Court held that
4 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (stressing "the state may also enforce regulations
of the time, place and manner of expression which are content-neutral, are narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication"); see REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at 431 (stating "[tihe
Constitution permits the government to place limited time, place and manner restrictions
on the right to speak in a public forum to ensure that those who wish to speak can be
heard"); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (remarking
"reasonable 'time, place and manner' regulations on speech may be necessary to further
significant governmental interests, and are permitted"). See generally Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 799-800 (noting "[elven protected speech
is not equally permissible in all places and at all times.").
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion"); see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1991) (explaining "[ilt is beyond dispute
that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so') (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
6 REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at 506 (discussing the "competing approaches to
interpretation" of the Establishment Clause). Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing,
330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (construing Establishment Clause to require complete separation
of church and state), with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (discussing the
role religion plays in society and reasoning the complete separation of church and state is
hostile to religion).
7 See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (asserting the First Amendment
erected a "wall of separation between church and state"); see also Everson, 330 U.S. at 18
(arguing there cannot be the "slightest breach" of church and state).
8 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (commenting "[slome relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable"); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212-13 (1963) (discussing the role religion has played
in our nation's history); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313 (remarking on religious references in our
society); Glenn S. Gordon, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly Breaking Down the Barriers to
Religious Displays, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 187 (1985) (explaining
"[accomodationists... argue that the framers of the establishment clause meant only to
prevent the government from favoring one sect over another and did not intend to forbid
neutral government support for religion as a whole").
9 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1981) (presenting "the question whether a
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the University of Missouri at Kansas City had created a forum
for use by student groups, and thus could not exclude from its
facilities a student group that was religious in nature.10 The
Court applied the analysis used in Widmar to public high schools
by upholding the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act in
Board of Education v. Mergens.l l Recently, in Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, the Court held that Milford violated the
free speech rights of the Good News Club, a Christian
organization for children ages six to twelve, when it refused the
Club entry to the school after hours. 12 By denying the Club access
to the school's facilities because of the Club's religious nature,
state university, which makes its facilities generally available for the activities of
registered student groups, may close its facilities to a registered student group desiring to
use the facilities for religious worship and religious discussion"); see Nicole B. Casarez,
Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shitting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination,
64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 522-25 (2000) (noting Widmarwas the first of the "Education Cases"
finding viewpoint discrimination in a case "involving access to school facilities or student
fees").
10 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (holding "[hiaving created a forum generally open to
student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious
speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation
of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation
under applicable constitutional standards."); see also Dena S. Davis, Religious Clubs in
the Public Schools: What Happened after Mergens 64 ALB. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000)(stating "[i]n Widmar v. Vincent; the Supreme Court held that a public university in the
State of Missouri was required to allow religiously based student groups the same access
to school facilities as it afforded to other student groups"); Allan Gordus, Note, The
Establishment Clause and Prayers in Public High School Graduations. Jones v. Clear
Creek Independent School District, 47 ARK. L. REV. 653, 662 (1994) (commenting "in
Widmar v. Vincent the Supreme Court held that a university had to allow religious
student groups the same access to its facilities that it had accorded other student
groups").
11 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (holding "the Equal Access Act
does not on its face contravene the Establishment Clause"); see REDLICH, ET AL., supra
note 2, at 464 (commenting that in Mergens, "[tihe Court's analysis paralleled that of
Widmar."); Davis, supra note 10, at 225 (noting "[tihe Equal Access Act, upheld by the
Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Mergens, requires public secondary schools to
allow access to religiously based student groups on the same basis as other student
clubs"); see also Howard M. Baik, Note, Chandler v. James: A Student's Right of Prayer in
Public Schools, 15 BYU J. PUB. L. 243, 255 (2001) (stating "[t]he Supreme Court, in
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, later upheld the constitutionality of the Act and
ruled it to be within the bounds of the Establishment Clause").
12 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001) (holding "[wlhen
Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school's limited public forum on the
ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of
its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.");
see also Richard Collin Mangrum, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Teaching
Morality from a Rehgious Perspective on School Premises Aier Hours, 35 CREIGHTON L.
REV 1023, 1026-29 (2002) (explaining Justice Thomas' majority decision); David H.
Sundwall, Note, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Can Religion Mix With Public
Schools 4 J. L. FAM. STUD. 183, 183 (2002) (noting "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court held in a
six to three decision that a public school violated the free speech rights of a religious club
by barring its use of the school's facilities.").
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Milford discriminated based solely on viewpoint. 13
The purpose of this note is to examine the Supreme Court's
continued practice of granting little consideration to the
Establishment Clause when examining religious speech in
education. Supreme Court holdings in this area seem to suggest
that as long as the speech in question survives Free Speech
analysis, it must be constitutional. In its attempt to protect the
viewpoint of religious speakers, the Court has begun to ignore
the role that the Establishment Clause plays in protecting the
fundamental rights of not only religious organizations and their
members, but also the rights of the students who attend class in
these forums.14 These students have the right to be free from
feeling pressured into joining a religious group or religious
activity. 15
Part II of this comment begins with a discussion of Freedom of
Speech in public places, and continues with a discussion of the
Establishment Clause. Part II then concludes with a discussion
of the additional concerns and issues raised by both the Free
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause when addressing
religious speech in public education. Part III provides an in-
depth look at the Good News decision. Part IV suggests that the
Court has taken another step toward eradicating the separation
between church and state. Part V analyzes the possibility that
13 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108 (concluding that Club's teaching of moral lessons
from Christian perspective is speech with religious viewpoint, therefore school's exclusion
constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); see also Mangrum, supra note 12,
at 1027 (explaining that "the Court found that Milford's exclusion of the Good News Club
constituted 'viewpoint discrimination'"); Sundwall, supra note 12, at 186 (noting "the
Court held that the Milford policy banning religious organizations was unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination, which was not justified by relying on the Establishment
Clause").
14 See generally Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 142-45 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(distinguishing Good News Club from Lamb's Chapel, Rosenburger, and Widmar, based
on timing and format of challenged activity); Chris Brown, Note, Good News? Supreme
Court Overlooks the Impressionability of Elementary-Aged Students in Finding a
Parental Permission Slip Sufficient to Avoid an Establishment Clause Violation, 27
DAYTON L. REV. 269, 290 (2002) (arguing Court's holding injures students by eradicating
protection from religious coercion). But see Mangrum, supra note 12, at 1074 (concluding
"the Court's opinion may provide a foundation for a more coherent free exercise and
establishment jurisprudence").
15 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (stating "the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or
its exercise"); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (0, Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing government endorsement of religion sends message to nonadherents
that they are disfavored); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (explaining government "can neither
force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion").
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the Court's decision in Good News could actually injure
organizations such as the Good News Club, more than it has
helped them.
II. ESTABLISHING A RIGHT OF RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN PUBLIC
EDUCATION.
Free Speech in a public forum is a complicated right. 16 The
right to religious speech is even more complicated because
Establishment Clause concerns are now thrown into the
analysis. 17 The right to express one's religious viewpoint in the
forum of public education has developed through numerous
Supreme Court decisions. 1 8
Freedom of Speech in Public Places
Government property is split into various classes that confer
differing levels of rights to the speaker dependent on the nature
of the property. 19  Perry Education Ass n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n2  is the lead opinion on public forums. 21  The
16 See Sheri M. Danz, Note, A Nonpublic Forum or a Brutal Bureaucracy?Advocates'
Claims of Access to Welfare Center Waiting Rooms, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1004, 1031 (2000)
(discussing complications that have developed in public forum analysis since Perry); C.
Thomas Dienes, Commentary, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First
Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 111-15 (1986) (explaining development
of public forum analysis); see also Philip L. Hirschhorn, Note, Noncommercial Door-To-
Door Solicitation and The Proper Standard of Review For Municipal Time, Place, and
Manner Restrictions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1146-49 (1987) (clarifying complications
relating to public forum analysis).
17 REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at 463 (commenting "Itlhe additional concerns and
issues raised by the Establishment Clause make religious speech in public places more
complicated than other speech.")
18 See infra text accompanying notes 20-154.
19 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
(asserting there are three categories of public property); REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at
446 (discussing the "modern approach" to speech in public places); see U.S. Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 132-33 (1981) (noting restrictions and
classifications that are placed on public forums); see also Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980) (stating the three theories behind
public forum analysis).
20 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
21 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 44 (stating "[tihe existence of a right of access to
public property and the standard by which limitations upon such a right must be
evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue."). See generally
Martha H. Good, Comment, The Expansion of Exclusive Privileges for Public Sector
Unions: A Threat to First Amendment RightsZ 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 781, 788-92 (1984)
(explaining Supreme Court's decision and rationale in Perry); Pamela A. Schechter, Note,
Public Forum Analysis and State Owned Publications: Beyond Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood
20031
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Perry decision held that public property is characterized into
three different types of forums:
1. the traditional public forum;2 2
2. the public forum by designation (also known as the limited
public forum);23 and
3. the non-public forum.24
The traditional public forum includes "places which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly
and debate" such as streets and parks. 25 If a State intends to
exclude speech based on its content, "it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."26 The State may
limit expression in a traditional public forum with time, place
and manner restrictions "which are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open alternative channels of communication."27
The second type of forum is the public forum by designation,28
also known as the limited public forum, where the government
has opened access to the forum for the discussion of limited topics
or for use only by certain groups.2 9 "Although a State is not
School District, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 244 (1986) (noting that decision in Perry
established current law on public forums).
22 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (declaring "places which by long tradition or by
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of the State to limit
expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.").
23 Id. (pronouncing "[a] second category consists of public property which the State
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.").
24 Id. at 46 (proclaiming "[plublic property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication is governed by different standards.").
25 Id. at 45 (stating "streets and parks... 'have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and.. .have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."') (quoting Hague v. Comm.
For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
26 PerryEduc. Assbn, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
27 PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45.
28 Id. (noting public forum by designation "consists of public property which the state
has opened for use by public as place of expressive activity."); see also Edward J. Neveril,
Comment, "Objective"Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at
the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1185, 1194 (1996) (listing
examples of specific designated public forums).
29 PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46, n.7 (declaring "a public forum may be created for
a limited purpose such as use by certain groups or for the discussion of certain subjects.");
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required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility,
as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in
a traditional public forum."30
The third type of forum, the non-public forum, involves
property "which is not by tradition or designation a forum for
public communication."31  If all property owned by the
government were accessible for public expression, the constant
interruptions would prevent governmental offices from
functioning effectively.32 The government can restrict the content
of speech in accordance with the "intended purposes" of the
forum if such restriction is reasonable and not an attempt to
suppress speech based on viewpoint.33
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc.,34 the Court further defined the characteristics of a public
forum by designation, stating, "[t]he government does not create
see also Susan Broberg, Note, Gay/Straight Alliances and Other Controversial Student
Groups: A New Test for the Equal Access Act, 1999 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 87, 101-07 (1999)
(suggesting certain groups which may fit into limited public forum). See generally Alan
Phelps, Note, Picketing and Prayer: Restricting Freedom ofExpression Outside Churches,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 271, 281 (1999) (defining limited public forum to only include certain
types of speech).
30 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46; see Gary S. Newberry, Note, Constitutional Law:
International Society for Krislna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: Is the Public Forum a Closed
Category, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 155, 157-60 (1993) (stating traditional and limited public
forums are held to strict standard of review); see also Susan Jill Rice, Note, The Search
for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial Response to Municipal
Policies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 561, 567-69
(1988) (discussing relationship between traditional and limited public forums require they
be held to same standard of review).
31 See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (recognizing "the 'First Amendment does not
guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by government.")
(quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30
(1981)). See generally Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78
(1998) (defining nonpublic forums and applicable restrictions).
32 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 53 (finding when government property is not
dedicated to open communication government may restrict its use to only those who are
participating in government's official interest); REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at 448
(commenting "[w]hen the government acted in its business capacity to serve the public, it
needed leeway to operate efficiently."); see also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ.
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 819 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining some
"outsiders" may be allowed to use nonpublic forum for expressive activity when they are
participants in government's official business); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976)
(declaring "the business of a military installation like Fort Dix [is] to train soldiers, not to
provide a public forum).
33 Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46 (asserting "li]n addition to time, place and
manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.");
see also Casarez, supra note 9, at 521-23 (explaining viewpoint discrimination is only
checkpoint to restrictions placed on nonpublic forums).
34 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
2003]
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a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public
discourse."35 Therefore, in determining whether a public forum
exists, the Court stated it would look to policy, practice, and the
nature of the property as an indication of whether the
government intended to designate the property as a public
forum.36 The Court will not hold that the government has created
a public forum, "in the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent"
or "when the nature of the property is inconsistent with
expressive activity."37
The Establishment Clause
The Court has developed various approaches to Establishment
Clause interpretation. 38 The two most prevalent approaches are
the strict separation theory and the government accommodation
stance. 39 The rationale of the strict separation theory was first
35 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n 523 U.S. at 677
(quoting development of public forum test stated in Cornelius); Int'l Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1992) (stressing importance of
government action in order to create public forum).
36 [Tlhe Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally open to
assembly and debate as a public forum. The Court has also examined the
nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern
the government's intent.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools: The
Validity of Schools' Regulation of Fighting Words and the Consequences if They Do Not,
28 AKRON L. REV. 187, 202 (1995) (stating schools may only be conceived as public forums
if it was policy of school officials to create them as such); see also Chiu v. Plano Indep.
Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 344 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing importance of nature of property
in determining whether it was intended to become public forum).
37 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803; Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F. 3d 995, 1002
(10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Cornelius requirement of clear government intent to establish
public forum); see also David A. Stoll, Comment, Public Forum Doctrine Crashes at
Kennedy Airport, Injuring Nine: International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1271, 1273-74 (1992) (commenting on standard that when
government has expressed a contrary intent, the Court will not find a public forum has
been created and asserting "[tihis standard effectively eviscerates the First Amendment,
because the government is empowered to ensure that little property will be categorized as
a public forum").
38 REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at 506 (discussing the "competing approaches to
interpretation of the religion clauses."). See Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County,
4 F.3d 1412, 1421 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting varying approaches courts have taken); David
Felsen, Comment, Developments in Approaches To Establishment Clause Analysis:
Consistency For the Future, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 395, 397 (1989) (discussing three doctrinal
approaches). See generally D.G.L., Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation
in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 130-43 (1985) (analyzing different approaches Court has
taken in Establishment Clause cases).
39 See Felsen, supra note 38, at 397-410 (discussing historical development of strict
GOOD NEWS CLUB V MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL
introduced by the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison.40 In an 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association,
Jefferson expressed his belief that there should be a "wall of
separation" between church and state.4 1 Madison believed the
words of the First Amendment Religion Clauses to mean "that
Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
manner contrary to their conscience." 42
The Supreme Court adopted the strict separation theory in
Everson v. Board of Education.43  The Court found the
separation and accommodation theory); Yehudah Mirsky, Note, Civil Religion and the
Establishment Clause 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1239-40 (1986) (describing different approaches
to meaning of Establishment Clause). See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679
(1984) (noting Court's reluctance to adopt one general Establishment Clause approach).
40 See Felsen, supra note 38, at 397-400 (commenting that the view of Jefferson and
Madison was "radical departure" from then existing views of separation); see also Robert
R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of Rights to the States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49
ALA. L. REV. 551, 590-91 (1998) (stating Supreme Court has relied upon strict separation
theory advocated by Madison and Jefferson); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1085, 1101 (1995) (describing societal changes that allowed views of Madison and
Jefferson to become prominent).
41 See David Steinberg, Tearing Down the Wall Separating Church and State, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., June 14, 2001, at B-9 & B-13 (arguing "Jefferson's letter in no way
suggests that government may not aid religious groups. Instead, Jefferson was writing to
assure members of a small religious group that they would not face persecution on
account of their religion."); see also James E.M. Craig, Comment, "In God We Trust,"
Unless We Are a Public Elementary School: Making a Case For Extending Equal Access
to Elementary Education, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 529, 532 (2000) (noting Jefferson did not
participate in drafting of Bill of Rights because he was out of country at time). See
generally Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 503, 507 (1990) (stating strict
separation is based upon Jefferson's concept of "wall of separation").
42 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 95 (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 424, 730). Compare
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to Madison as
"undoubtedly the most important architect among the Members of the House of the
Amendments which became the Bill of Rights," but noting that it "was James Madison
speaking as an advocate of sensible legislative compromise," and not as a "zealous
believer in the necessity of the Religion Clauses" because from "glimpses of Madison's
thinking, as reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789," it is clear "that he saw
the Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and
perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects," however he "did not see it as requiring
neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion"), and Craig, supra
note 41, at 522 (arguing Madison viewed First Amendment as prohibition on
establishment of national religion and prohibition on religious discrimination), with
Rezai, supra note 41, at 507 (noting Madison advocated separation between spiritual and
secular spheres).
43 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (applying strict separation standards to statute at issue); see
Theologos Verginis, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board: Is There
Salvation for the Establishment Clause? "With God All Things Are Possible", 34 AKRON L.
REV. 741, 743 (2001) (discussing Everson doctrine of "wall of separation"); see also John
Gay, Note, Bowen v. Kendrick.- Establishing a New Relationship Between Church and
State, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 953, 958 (1989) (stating Supreme Court did not specifically
address Establishment Clause until Everson).
2003]
356 ST JOHN'S JOURINAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
Establishment Clause required a strict separation of church and
state.44 Writing for the majority, Justice Black stated that the
Establishment Clause "was intended to erect 'a wall of separation
between church and state."45 The use of the "wall of separation"
language indicated that Black based his opinion on Jefferson's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause.46
Five years later, the accommodationist approach was
introduced in Zorach v. Clauson.47 Justice Douglas reasoned that
adherence to the strict separation theory would lead to
unnecessary hostility between the state and religion and disrupt
44 The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax
in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt
to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can,
openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between church and State."
Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16; see Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No.
71, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (reaffirming rationale of Everson that the First Amendment
has created a wall, "which must be kept high and impregnable").
45 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16, 18 (quoting Jefferson's "wall of separation" language and
stating additionally "[that wall must be kept high and impregnable"); see Peter J.
Weishaar, Comment, School Choice Vouchers and the Establishment Clause, 58 ALB. L.
REV. 543, 546 (1994) (interpreting Black's decision as having been influenced by writings
of Madison and Jefferson). See generally Koenick v. Felton, 190 F.3d 259, 264 (4th Cir.
1999) (quoting Everson "wall of separation" approach and noting difficulty of applying
approach).
46 See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand: Where Should the
Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Developments in Establishment Clause Theory
Accommodation, State Action, The Public Forum, and Private Religious Speech, 8 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1998) (finding "the Everson Court rested its
interpretation in the views expounded by Jefferson and Madison" because both were
influential in having the Establishment Clause inserted into the Constitution); Michael J.
Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the Establishment Clause: Equal
Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 95, 104 (1996)
(arguing Everson Court based its decision on opinions of Madison and Jefferson); Joseph
P. Viteritti, Panel Three: A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational Opportunity
Trumps Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 104
(2000) (arguing wall language used by court was metaphor from Jefferson); Note,
Rethinking the Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARv.
L. REV. 1700, 1704 (1992) (stating Everson Court wholly relied on Madison and Jefferson
to interpret Establishment Clause).
47 343 U.S. 306 (1952); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)
(quoting Clauson principle that First Amendment does not require total separation); see
also Felsen, supra note 38, at 405 (reasoning accommodation theory arose out of necessity
for new doctrine).
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many of our society's traditions.48 The government must be
neutral in its approach to religious activity.49
These opposing theories are important to this discussion
because they provide the foundation of how the Court views the
role of religious speech in public education.
Through the 1970's the view of strict separation theory could
primarily be found in school funding cases.5 0 The first decision
was the notable case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.51 Lemon involved
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that provided state aid
in the form of supplemental salaries to schoolteachers in
religious elementary and secondary schools.5 2 The Lemon Court
48 Clauson, 343 U.S. at 312-13 (stating "[t]he First Amendment, however, does not
say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State."); see
also Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for
Rehgion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1995) (arguing complete
separation of church and state standard is too rigid standard and has therefore been
rejected); Rezai, supra note 41, at 511 (noting rationale behind accommodationist theory
is that complete government neutrality towards religion may negatively affect rights
granted under Free Exercise Clause). See generally REDLICH, ET AL., supra note 2, at 508-
09 (discussing Zorach decision).
49 See Clauson, 343 U.S. at 315 (commenting, "we find no constitutional requirement
which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight
against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence."). See generally Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 743-45 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (discussing examples of permissive accommodation without Establishment
Clause challenges); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985) (stating
"our cases have consistently recognized that [providing for the secular education of
schoolchildren] cannot validate government aid to parochial schools when the aid has the
effect of promoting a single religion or religion generally or when the aid unduly entangles
the government in matters religious"), overruled byAgostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232-
34 (1997) (clarifying neutrality is acceptable, but not excessive fostering of religious
worship).
50 See Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and
School Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 997, 1000 (2002) (commenting, "in the latter half of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court frequently used the Establishment Clause to
invalidate programs that utilized government funds to assist religiously affiliated schools,
even though these programs proved beneficial to both the students and the nation");
Viteritti, supra note 46, at 103 (opining "[t]he First Amendment jurisprudence of the
Burger Court was anchored by two decisions that strict separationists regularly cite in
their briefs against aid to religious schools"). But see Walz, 397 U.S. at 670 (concluding
"[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very existence of the Religion
Clauses is an involvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid excessive
entanglement").
51 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But see Felsen, supra note 38, at 408
(claiming Lemon "test.. dismantled Jefferson's and Madison's 'Wall of separation"'). See
generally Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795 (1973)
(acknowledging domino effect of fiscally deficient private schools that must increase
tuition, forcing parents to turn to public schools, thereby exacerbating problems of public
education, and resulting in diminished support for parochial schools, however, declining
to find that this outweighs relevant provisions and purposes of First Amendment that
safeguard "separation of Church from State and have been regarded from the beginning
as among the most cherished features of our constitutional system").
52 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-25 (explaining that under both statutes aid was provided to
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established a three-prong test for the purpose of analyzing
Establishment Clause cases: 1) "the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose"; 2) "its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and 3) "the
statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with
religion."' 53 This test is still applicable to Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, but the Court does not always apply it when
considering an Establishment Clause challenge.
Various justices of the Court have criticized the utility of the
Lemon test. Justice Scalia is one of its most outspoken critics,
advocating for the cessation of its use.54 He has refused to apply
private educational institutions that gave religious instruction, however Pennsylvania
statute furnished financial assistance to non-public elementary and secondary schools,
whereas Rhode Island statute limited assistance to teachers in private elementary schools
only, yet holding both statutes unconstitutional because "[u]nder our system the choice
has been made that government is to be entirely excluded from the area of religious
instruction and churches excluded from the affairs of government"). But see Walz, 397
U.S. at 676-78 (pointing out that aid in form of property tax exemptions for houses of
worship does confer financial benefit, but it is allowed because its application is neutral);
Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968) (reaching same
result as Everson, and holding New York statute constitutionally valid because fact that
free books may make it more likely that some children choose to attend sectarian school
"does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a religious
institution").
53 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (finding there are "three main 'evils' against which the
Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.'") (quoting Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122
S.Ct. 2460, 2476 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting majority's decision is
consistent with prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and noting "[a] central tool in
our analysis of cases in this area has been the Lemon test"); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963) (comparing and contrasting Free
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause, and policies underlying each).
54 Unlike Justice O'Connor, however, I would not replace Lemon with nothing,
and let the case law "evolve" into a series of situation specific rules(government speech on religious topics, government benefits to particular
groups, etc.) unconstrained by any "rigid influence[.}" The problem with (and
the allure of) Lemon has not been that it is "rigid," but rather that in many
applications it has been utterly meaningless, validating whatever result the
Court would desire. To replace Lemon with nothing is simply to announce that
we are now so bold that we no longer feel the need even to pretend that our
haphazard course of Establishment Clause decisions is governed by any
principle.
See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 750-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citations omitted) (rejecting Justice O'Connor's suggestion, in Kiryas Joel, that
Establishment Clause tests would be less problematic to apply if restructured to cover
narrower subject matter); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (likening Lemon to "some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once
again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free
School District" and joining "long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon
and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering
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Lemon because he believes it is too arbitrary:55 the Court has
used it when it desires to invalidate an activity it forbids,56 but
when the Court wishes to uphold an activity forbidden by the
test, it is simply disregarded.57
This strict separation view of aid to religious institutions
continued throughout the 1970's. 58 In PE.A.R.L. v. Nyquist,59 the
Court invalidated, under the primary effect prong of Lemon, a
program involving three forms of aid: direct grants to nonpublic
schools for maintaining and repairing facilities; a plan providing
tuition reimbursement to parents below a certain income level;
and tax relief for those parents who did not qualify for the
reimbursement. 60 Levitt v. PE.A.R.L.61 invalidated a New York
law that reimbursed private schools for administering and
reporting the scores of state required tests; some of the tests were
prepared by the state, but others were prepared by teachers in
nonpublic schools. 62 The statute failed Establishment Clause
shapes its intermittent use has produced."); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 638-44 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (gloating that "[tihe Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of
Lemon by essentially ignoring it, and the interment of that case may be the one happy
byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision") (citation omitted).
55 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (stating "[tihe secret of the Lemon test's survival, I
think, is that it is so easy to kill."). See Marc C. Rahdert, A Jurisprudence of Hope; Justice
Blackmun and the Freedom of Rehgion, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 73 (1998) (concluding
Court's "notable avoidance of Lemon in several of its recent decisions strongly suggests
that the test is currently held in low esteem ... [and that] Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued that Lemon should be either overruled or
abandoned"). See generally Bd. of Educ. of Karyas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist., 512 U.S. at 720
(O'Connor J., concurring) (stating Lemon test is so easy to disregard as evidenced by
instances in which test has not been applied) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984)); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971) (proffering that determination
must be made in light of all previous decisions with regard to Establishment Clause).
56 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (arguing "[wihen we wish to strike down a practice
it forbids, we invoke it").
57 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 399 (arguing "when we wish to uphold a practice it
forbids, we ignore it entirely"). See generally Frank, supra note 50, at 1009-11 (identifying
inconsistencies with application of Lemon test).
58 See generally Inke Muehlohoff, Freedom of Religion in Public Schools in Germany
and in the United States, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 405, 413-25 (2000) (discussing
Court's use of strict separation theory and Lemon test).
59 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
60 P.E.A.R.L. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-794 (1973) (finding "[sipecial tax
benefits... cannot be squared with the principle of neutrality established by the decisions
of this Court. To the contrary, insofar as such benefits render assistance to parents who
send their children to sectarian schools, their purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and
advance those religious institutions."); see also Viteritti, supra note 46, at 103
(characterizing Court's decision, that when aid is given to religious schools it is equivalent
to giving money to religious institutions, as "remarkable leap in logic").
61 Levitt v. P.E.A.R.L., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
62 See Levitt, 413 U.S. at 482 (holding lump-sum payments to private schools as
violation of Establishment Clause because amount of payment could not be calculated in
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analysis because it provided no guarantee that the state required
tests would be administered in a manner free of religious
instruction. 63 Meek v. Pittenger,64 invalidated two Pennsylvania
statutes granting extensive educational aid in the form of
"auxiliary services," (such as psychological services, speech and
hearing therapy, testing and related services for exceptional,
remedial and educationally disadvantaged students) textbooks,
and "instructional materials." 65 Justice Stewart found that the
state would need to continuously watch over the nonpublic
schools to ensure that these funds went to strictly secular
purposes, and that such continuous involvement would constitute
an excessive entanglement of the church and state.66
In the 1980's the doctrine shifted as the justices began to apply
the accommodationist theory.67 The first decision came in
PEA.R.L. v. Regan,68 which upheld a statute enacted by the
New York Legislature to fix the constitutional invalidity of the
statute struck down in Levitt. The new statute did not allow for
way that would only reimburse secular costs).
63 See Levitt, at 480 (commenting "[w]e cannot ignore the substantial risk that these
examinations, prepared by teachers under the authority of religious institutions, will be
drafted with an eye, unconsciously or otherwise, to inculcate students in the religious
precepts of the sponsoring church.").
64 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
791 2000).
Meek, 421 U.S. at 354-55 (noting "instructional materials" consist of "periodicals,
photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings, films 'or any other printed and published
materials of a similar nature."')
66 See Meek, 421 U.S. at 370 (stating the same "excessive entanglement" required of
the government in Lemon would be required of Pennsylvania in this situation); see also
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973) (noting "[alid normally may be thought to have
a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is
so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting"); cf Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976)
(focusing on character of institutions receiving aid in deciding whether institution was
able to separate secular and religious functions) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 688 (1971)).
67 See generally Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief Conduct
and Judicial Benchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (2000) (noting revival of
accommodation theory caused Supreme Court justices to return to broad interpretations
of Free Exercise Clause); Viteritti, supra note 46, at 103-08 (discussing First Amendment
decisions in later years of Burger Court and discussing First Amendment decisions of
Rehnquist Court).
68 Regan, 444 U.S. 646; see also Viteritti, supra note 46, at 105 (suggesting this
decision is first case that led to destruction of high wall of separation between church and
state). See generally Note, The Constitutionality of Tax Relief for Parents of Children
Attending Public and Nonpublic Schools, 67 MINN. L. REV. 793, 802 (1983) (opining Regan
decision indicates Supreme Court's tolerance to "some degree of continuing state
involvement with church schools" provided this involvement does not necessitate
inspection and assessment by state of religious content of certain educational services).
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reimbursement costs of teacher-prepared tests, and provided for
audits to ensure that funds were only being used for sectarian
purposes. 69 The Court applied the Lemon test in Mueller v.
Allen70 to uphold a Minnesota statute granting tax deductions to
parents for tuition, textbooks, and transportation.71 The Court
found the statute constitutional on three grounds under the
primary effect prong of Lemon: the deduction was only one of
several deductions available under the Minnesota tax code; the
statute allowed deductions to all parents, and thus to all children
received benefit, not just those attending non-public schools; and
the benefits were given directly to the individual parents rather
than to the school. 72
Throughout Establishment Clause jurisprudence, numerous
other views, in addition to the competing approaches of strict
separation and government accommodation, have been espoused
concerning what theory the Court should use to decide these
cases. 73 In addition to Lemon, a few Justices have developed their
own tests on how to analyze the activity.74 These alternatives
acknowledge that religious speech is guaranteed the right of
access, while also recognizing the Establishment Clause rights of
those in the environment in which the activity is taking place.75
69 See Regan, 444 U.S. at 659-62 (agreeing with argument that excessive
entanglement would not result because it is apparent which services would be
reimbursed). See generally Jonathan Friedman, Charitable Choice and the Establishment
Clause, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 103, 116 (1997) (finding similar statute "blends the
secular and sectarian to such an extent that the separate funding of the secular will be
difficult to achieve and still more difficult to monitor").
70 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
71 Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-403 (applying the Lemon test). But see Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463-64 (1973) (holding "free textbooks, like tuition grants directed
to private school students, are a form of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the
private schools themselves").
72 See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396-402 (noting statute does not have "primary effect of
advancing the sectarian aims of the nonpublic schools"); see also REDLICH, ET AL., supra
note 2, at 518 (discussing the Court's focus on the primary effect prong); Elizabeth A.
Baergen, Note, Tuition Tax Deductions and Credits in Light of Mueller v. Allen, 31
WAYNE L. REV. 157, 167-72 (1984) (discussing Mueller decision).
73 See Felsen, supra note 38, at 398 (discussing pluralism approach); Scott A. Fenton,
Comment, School Voucher Programs: An Idea Whose Time Has Arrived, 26 CAP. U. L.
REV. 645, 649 (1997) (discussing neutrality approach in addition to strict separation
theory); Rezai, supra note 41, at 506 (naming "flexible accommodation" doctrine).
74 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-99 (1992) (presenting Coercion Test);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67-84 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (improving
Endorsement Test); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (presenting Endorsement Test).
75 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (considering position of all students when applying
Coercion Test); Lynch, 465 U.S at 687- 88 (arguing government endorsement or
disapproval sends improper message to members of political community).
2003]
362 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:347
Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test
In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,76 Justice
O'Connor presented her endorsement test in hopes of clarifying
Establishment Clause doctrine. 77  She claimed that the
government would violate the Establishment Clause in two ways:
1) "excessive entanglement with religious institutions '"7 8 and 2)
"government endorsement or disapproval of religion."7 9
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message."80
Justice O'Connor uses two of the three prongs of the Lemon
test as the foundation for her endorsement test.8 1 She interprets
the purpose prong of the Lemon test as asking "whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion." 2 She interprets the effects prong as
seeking to determine "whether, irrespective of the government's
76 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
77 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "I write separately to
suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine."). But see Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at a
Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 151 (1992) (opining Justice O'Connor's endorsement
test is "in tension with her accoinmodationist interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause");
Jeremy Speich, Comment, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe: Mapping the
Future of Student-Led, Student-Initiated Prayer in Public Schools, 65 ALB. L. REV. 271,
276 (2001) (stating O'Connor's endorsement test often "overshadows the importance and
viability of the Lemon test").
78 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring);.
81 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
under the endorsement test "Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a statute
requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and
whether the statute actually conveys a message of endorsement."); Lynch, 465 U.S. at
690-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (construing Lemon test as has having both subjective
and objective components); see also FRANK S. RAVITCH, SCHOOL PRAYER AND
DISCRIMINATION 48 (Northeastern University Press 1999) (stating Endorsement test is
sometimes characterized as being part of Lemon test and at other times characterized as
separate test).
82 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing purpose prong
of Lemon test and arguing "the mere existence of some secular purpose" does not satisfy
this prong); see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, Comptroller of Public Accounts of
Texas, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (citing Lynch and noting that requirement of secular
legislative purpose for statutes prevents government from supporting single religious
belief ); Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 895 F. Supp. 1564, 1577 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(commenting the purpose prong "is focussed [sic] on whether there is a primary secular
purpose for the statute and not whether any religious purpose can be uncovered").
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actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a
message of endorsement or disapproval." 83 Therefore, according
to Justice O'Connor, courts are required, when examining a
challenged practice, to inquire whether the government's purpose
is to endorse (or disapprove) religion and whether that practice
actually conveys such a message of endorsement (or
disapproval). 84 She is focusing on the subjective and objective
aspects of the practice, addressing both the subjective intent of
the speaker and the resultant objective message received by the
community.8 5
"The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content
it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose
and effect." 86 According to Justice O'Connor, church and state
will inevitably carry on in the same community, leading to both
the integration and conflict of governmental interests with
religious interests. 87 A statute may have "an incidental or
primary effect of helping or hindering a sectarian belief," though
83 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690, 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting effects prong
has been "properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a government practice
merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of
religion."); see also Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501,
1508 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding any religious effect that is secondary to secular effect does not
render policy as endorsement); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(evaluating considerations of Establishment Clause analysis).
84 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing objective and
subjective functions of Lemon inquiry); see also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 483 U.S. at 348 (noting that to recognize actual effect is first step in challenge on
Establishment Clause grounds); Lynch, 465 U.S at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(concluding subjective element is purpose prong and objective element is effect prong of
Lemon test).
85 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "[tihe meaning of a
statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the
'objective' meaning of the statement in the community."); see also Ben Ritterspach,
Article, Refusal of Medical Treatment on the Basis of Religion and an Analysis of the
Duty to Mitigate Damages Under Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 25 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 381,
391 (1999) (stating objective aspects will dominate); Kathryn R. Williams, Recent
Decision, Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995), 69
TEMPLE L. REV. 1609, 1618 n.82 (1996) (pointing out disparity in information access
among citizens of community mandates that both objective and subjective components be
analyzed).
86 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70, (stating "church and state must necessarily operate
within the same community. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular
interests of government and the religious interests of various sects and their adherents
will frequently intersect, conflict and combine."); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589, 612 (1988) (concluding it is not surprising that Government's secular concerns would
either coincide or conflict with those of religious institutions); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 810 (1983) (noting not every governmental act which coincides with or conflicts
with particular religious belief is, for that reason, Establishment Clause violation).
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the legislature had no such intention; "[c]haos would ensue if
every such statute were invalid under the Establishment
Clause."8 8
Justice Kennedy's Coercion Test
Justice Kennedy applied his own test in Lee v. Weisman.8 9 In
Lee, the Court ruled that permitting public school officials to
invite members of the clergy to a public high school graduation
ceremony, for the purposes of delivering invocation and
benedictions, violated the Establishment Clause.90  "[Tihe
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone
to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise
act in a way which 'establishes a state religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so."' 91 He cited to previous decisions recognizing
"that prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk of
indirect coercion," and insisted that students must be protected
from that coercion. 92 Justice Kennedy further noted that this
concern is most evident in public education, but is not limited to
that environment. 93
The Court found the degree of school involvement in Lee
clearly evidenced State support of the religious activity and thus
those students who objected to the invocation and benediction,
were placed in an "untenable position."94 The direct supervision
88 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (adding "Itihe task for the
Court is to sort out those statutes and government practices whose purpose and effect go
against the grain of religious liberty protected by the First Amendment.").
89 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (applying Coercion test, which had been set forth previously
in concurring opinions of County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), and Board
of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)).
90 Lee, 505 U.S. at 596-99 (stating "the state-imposed character of an invocation and
benediction by clergy selected by the school combine to make a prayer a state-sanctioned
religious exercise in which the student was left with no alternative but to submit."); see
Doe v. Sch. Bd., 274 F.3d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that practicing verbal prayer
in public school violated Establishment Clause). But see Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265,
281 (41h Cir. 2001) (stating moment of silence does not have coercive effect).
91 Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
92 Lee 505 U.S. at 592 (citing to: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. of
Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
93 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661(1989))
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (commenting "[tihe concern may not be limited to the context of
schools, but it is most pronounced there"). See generally Matthew A. Peterson, Note, The
Supreme Court's Coercion Test: Insufficient Constitutional Protection for America's
Religious Minorities, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 245, 249 (2001) (discussing Court's
rationale).
94 Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (focusing analysis on position of students: "both those who
desired the prayer and she who did not."). See generally Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch.
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by the school district resulted in public pressure, and peer
pressure, on graduating students to join in the invocation and
benediction. 95 Justice Kennedy felt that the pressure felt by
attending students, "though subtle and indirect, can be as real as
overt compulsion."96
Consistent with a religious organization's Free Speech rights,
Justice Kennedy also recognized that "[a] relentless and all-
pervasive attempt to exclude religion from every aspect of public
life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution."97 Yet,
his test maintains the Establishment Clause rights of the
students by focusing on the message that the religious activity
portrays to them. 98
In the dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the coercion test,
referring to it as the "psychological coercion" test.99 He described
the test as "boundless," and therefore easy to manipulate 00
Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1992) (analyzing government's direct and complete
control over issue of graduation prayers as determinative regarding Establishment
Clause inquiry).
95 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. See generally ACLU v. Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d 1471, 1480
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that to require students "to either conform to the model worship
commanded by the plurality or absent themselves from graduation and thereby forego one
of the most important events in their lives" is improper); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch.
Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Va. 1993) (discussing Lee Court's focus on coercive
pressure felt by students who did not desire to participate).
96 Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. See generallyNewdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 609 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating, "under Lee,.. .even without a recitation requirement for each child, the
mere fact that a pupil is required to listen every day to the statement 'one nation under
God' has a coercive effect"); Black Horse Pike, 84 F.3d at 1480 (commenting an objector's
attendance at his/her graduation, in effect, gives appearance of participation and further
asserting such appearance must be avoided).
97 Lee, 505 U.S. at 598; see also Craig, supra note 41, at 557 (stating Kennedy
recognized that sending young and impressionable elementary students message of
hostility towards religion could result in country traveling down path of religious
intolerance). See generally Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that religion and Constitution share common background and
that government must protect those commonalties in certain circumstances).
98 Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (analyzing issue from the view of both students who desire to
participate in prayer and those who do not). See generally Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch.
Dist., 809 P.2d 809, 874-75 (Cal. 1991) (focusing on perceptions of all individuals at school
where religious message is broadcast); Myron Schreck, Balancing the Right to Pray at
Graduation and the Responsibility of the Disestablishment, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1869, 1873
(1995) (asserting coercion test considers surrounding circumstances of those to be exposed
to prayer).
99 Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Justice Kennedy's test; "lals
its instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering, the Court invents a
boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion"); see also County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 650, n.6 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (posturing that Kennedy's coercion test is out of step with precedent).
See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22, 84 (1992) (commenting on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lee).
100 Lee, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally David Schimmel,
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Finally, he criticized the Justices for having "gone beyond the
realm where judges know what they are doing."101
Religious Speech in Public Education
Widmar v. Vincent
The first case in which the Court addressed the access rights of
religious speech in public education was Widmar v. Vincent.o2
The University of Missouri at Kansas City, a state university,
had a policy of encouraging the activities of student
organizations, and routinely provided facilities for the meetings
of registered organizations. 103 In 1977, the University informed
the registered religious group Cornerstone that it could no longer
conduct its meetings in University buildings.O4 The decision to
exclude Cornerstone was based on a regulation that prohibited
the use of University property (except chapels), "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching."105  Eleven student
Graduation Prayers Flunk Coercion Test: An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 76 WEST'S
EDUC. L. REP. 913, 918 (1992) (exploring views expressed in Justice Scalia's dissent);
Sullivan, supra note 99, at 84 (commenting on Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lee).
101 Lee, 505 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing majority's citations to
psychological research, which have no connection to issue of case, cannot conceal fact that
Court has gone beyond scope of its judicial duties). See generally Schimmel, supra note
100, at 918 (highlighting arguments of Justice Scalia's dissent); Sullivan, supra note 99,
at 84 (outlining Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Lee).
102 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); see also Martha M. McCarthy,
Community Groups Using Public Schools for Religious Meetings: Will It Be Good News?,
152 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 15, 15 (2001) (noting in context of access to a public forum,
some commentators regard Widmar as the first decision in which religious expression was
given equal treatment to secular speech); Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the
Supreme Court's Emerging Consensus on the Line Between Establishment and Pivate
Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 703 (2001) (identifying Widmaras first in line
of case law to address rights of private speakers to discuss religion on public property).
103 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 (stating the University had given official recognition
to over 100 student groups). See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842-43 (1995) (discussing access of facilities provided to university
students).
104 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 (revealing that from 1973 until 1977, Cornerstone had
been granted permission to hold its meetings in campus facilities on regular basis); see
also Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 226 F. Supp. 2d. 401, 418 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (discussing University's withdrawal of permission in 1977).
105 4.0314.0107 - No University buildings or grounds (except chapels as herein
provided) may be used for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching
by either student or non-student groups ... The general prohibition against
use of University buildings and grounds for religious worship or religious
teaching is a policy required, in the opinion of the Board of Curators, by the
Constitution and laws of the State and is not open to any other construction.
No regulations shall be interpreted to forbid the offering of prayer or other
appropriate recognition of religion at public functions held in University
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members of Cornerstone, brought suit to challenge the
University's regulation, arguing violations of free exercise of
religion, equal protection, and freedom of speech under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.106 The Court held that the
University created "a forum generally open to student groups,"
and therefore could not exclude Cornerstone based on the
religious content of the group's speech.107
Widmar was decided before Perry, but discussed what Perry
would later term the public forum by designation. 08 The
University chose to open its facilities for use by all student
groups and, by doing so, it assumed the obligation to justify all
exclusions and discriminations against constitutional
standards:109 exclusions must be content-neutral and narrowly
drawn to achieve the end of a compelling state interest.10 "The
facilities...
4.0314.0108 - Regular chapels established on University grounds may be used
for religious services but not for regular recurring services of any groups.
Special rules and procedures shall be established for each such chapel by the
Chancellor. It is specifically directed that no advantage shall be given to any
religious group.
Widnar, 454 U.S. at 265, n.3 (listing pertinent regulations adopted by Board of Curators
in 1972).
106 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 266; see also Capitol Square Review, 515 U.S. at 762-63
(identifying legal grounds upon which students made their claims).
107 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 2777 (stating "[hlaving created a forum generally open to
student groups, the University seeks to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious
speech. Its exclusionary policy violates the fundamental principle that a state regulation
of speech should be content-neutral, and the University is unable to justify this violation
under applicable constitutional standards."). See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 842
(averring that providing facilities to students to discuss religious subjects does not violate
Establishment Clause); Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 702 (D.D.C. 1994)
(distinguishing Widmar from facts at issue).
108 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(citing use of University meeting facilities in Widmar as example of public forum "which
the State has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity."); see also
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1985) (discussing
Widmar Court's finding that university had created a public forum); G. Sidney Buchanan,
Toward a Unified Theory of Governmental Power to Regulate Protected Speech, 18 CONN
L. REV. 531, 566 (explaining "a university campus is not a traditional public forum in the
same sense as streets, sidewalks, and parks").
109 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267, n.5 (citing to previous decisions recognizing "that
the campus of a public university, at least for its students, possesses many of the
characteristics of a public forum"); see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (noting that once
there is limited public forum, boundaries created by it must be respected); Kriemer v.
Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1257 (3d Cir. 1992) (following Widmar for principle that
opening forum for public use creates obligation to justify regulation of that forum).
110 See Widrnar, 454 U.S. at 270 (finding "the University must therefore satisfy the
standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must show its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end."); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (revealing that state must show
compelling interest in order to regulate public forum).
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Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a
forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to
create the forum in the first place."" II
The University claimed that its compelling interest was
maintaining a separation of church and state to avoid a possible
violation of the Establishment Clause."l 2 The Court agreed that
this interest may be deemed compelling, but found that granting
equal access to all organizations, whether religious or secular,
would be consistent with the prior Establishment Clause cases.11 3
To support its argument, the Court conducted a Lemon analysis
and found the equal access policy was constitutional. 1 4
The Court then proceeded to state that the University
misunderstood the legal issue of the case.1 15 The issue was not
whether allowing a religious organization to use public
University facilities would result in an Establishment Clause
violation."l 6 Rather, the constitutional question was whether the
111 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68; PerryEduc. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing to Widmar
for principle that state may not enforce certain restrictions, from generally open forum,
although state was not required to create such forum).
112 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270 (discussing University's argument that an
Establishment Clause violation would result if it allowed religious groups and speakers to
use its facilities). See generally Church on the Rock v. City of Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273,
1280 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating "[tlhe Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that
providing equal access to a designated public forum for citizens engaging in religious
expression and citizens engaging in secular expression does not violate the Establishment
Clause"); Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1394, n.17 (11th Cir. 1993)
(discussing roles of Free Speech Clause and Establishment Clause in public forum
analysis).
113 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271 (stating "[wie agree that the interest of the University in
complying with its constitutional obligations may be characterized as compelling. It does
not follow, however, that an 'equal access' policy would be incompatible with this Court's
Establishment Clause cases."); see also Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839
(1995) (noting Court has rejected argument that Establishment Clause justifies denial of
free speech to religious speakers in neutral government programs); Fairfax Covenant
Church v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703, 707 (4th Cir. 1994) (identifying
circumstances analogous to those in Widmar, and concluding Establishment Clause
concerns are not sufficiently compelling to justify content-based discrimination).
114 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-74 (finding first two prongs of test to be easily
satisfied, and noting "any religious benefit of an open forum at UKMC would be
'incidental' within the meaning of our cases"). See generally supra notes 51-57, and
accompanying text.
115 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 (declaring "[tlhe University's argument misconceives
the nature of this case."). See generafly Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469,
476 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting government must be accorded some leeway when making self-
policing decisions regarding employee conduct that involves inevitable tensions between
Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause); Chabad-Lubavitch, 5 F.3d at 1393-95
(discussing substantive overlap and doctrinal tension between Free Speech and
Establishment Clause concerns).
116 Widnar, 454 U.S. at 273 (asserting "[tihe question is not whether the creation of a
religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause."); see also Chabad-Lubavitch, 5
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University could exclude the organization based on the religious
content of its speech.!17 The Court found that any religious
benefits gained by Cornerstone through equal access would only
be incidental. 1'8
The Equal Access Act,19 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which
receives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited
open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a
meeting within that limited open forum on the basis of the
religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings. 120
The constitutionality of the Act was challenged in Board of
Education v. Mergens.121 Petitioners, the School Board of
Westside High School, argued that allowing public schools to
recognize religious activities would result in school endorsement
of the religious club and a violation of the Establishment
Clause.122 The Court rejected this argument, using an analysis
which paralleled that of Widmar.123  "[Tihere is a crucial
F.3d at 1394 n.17 (commenting, in a public forum, an Establishment Clause cannot
outweigh Free Speech rights).
117 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 (averring "[tihe University has opened its facilities
for use by students groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups
because of the content of their speech."). See generally Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828
(holding government is prohibited from regulating speech based on content or viewpoint);
Fairfax Covenant Church, 17 F.3d at 706 (noting state institutions that have created
public fora cannot then discriminate against religious organizations without compelling
interest narrowly tailored to achieve their aims).
118 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273-74 (providing two reasons to support finding that
incidental benefits granted to religion would not violate effect prong of Lemon: 1) "an open
forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious
sects or practices"; and 2) "the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well
as religious speakers"). See generally Good News/Good Sports Club, 28 F.3d at 1508
(holding any incidental benefits to religion are secondary to primary secular effect of
neutral forum).
119 Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2002).
120 Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. 4071(a); see Pope, 12 F.3d at 1251 (finding defendant
school created limited open forum, thereby triggering Equal Access Act). See generally
Ceniceros, 106 F.3d at 880 (reviewing interpretations of this statute).
121 Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
122 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-48 (noting argument of School Board "that because
the school's recognized student activities are an integral part of its educational mission,
official recognition of respondents' proposed club would effectively incorporate religious
activities into the school's official program, endorse participation in the religious club, and
provide the club with an official platform to proselytize other students.").
123 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (concluding logic of Widmar is also applicable to
analysis of Equal Access Act); see also Ceniceros, 106 F.3d at 882 (recognizing, in context
of Equal Access Act inquiry, Establishment Clause challenges are strikingly similar to
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difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect."' 24 The Court found that students in secondary schools
possess the maturity to recognize when their school is endorsing
a particular religious activity or when the school is merely
allowing the practice of the activity on a non-discriminatory
basis.125
The Court's application of Widmar in subsequent decisions
regarding religious speech in public education.
Twelve years after Widmar, the Court addressed the issue of
religious groups using public school facilities after the hours of
instruction in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District.126 New York Education Law §414 provides ten
specified purposes for which local school boards can adopt
reasonable regulations allowing for the use of school property by
the community.127 Meetings for religious purposes are not
included within the law. 128
those in Widmar); cf Pope, 12 F.3d at 1255 (rejecting defendant's argument that making
exception to state law in order to comply with Equal Access Act would create implication
of religious endorsement).
124 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250. See generally Ceniceros, 106 F.3d at 882-83 (discussing
school district's attempts to distinguish Mergens from the facts in issue); Chabad-
Lubavitch v. Miller 5 F.3d 1383, 1392 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating, "the failure to censor is not
synonymous with endorsement").
125 See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (finding "secondary students are mature enough
and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that
it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."). See generally Cecineros, 106 F.3d at
882-83 (rejecting argument that time of meetings, lunchtime versus after-school, would
violate the Establishment Clause, on ground that, in either case, students retain their
capacity to distinguish between neutrality and endorsement); cf Peck v. Upshur County
Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 288 (1998) (reasoning "[i]n elementary schools, the concerns
animating the coercion principle are at their strongest because of the impressionability of
young elementary-age children. Moreover, because children of these ages may be unable
to fully recognize and appreciate the difference between government and private speech").
126 Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993)
(defining issue as whether, in context of applicable state law, there is violation of Free
Speech when a church is denied access to school premises).
127 New York Educ. Law § 414 (2002); see Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (reviewing
state statute and commenting that School Board issued rules and regulations for use of
school property, allowing for only two of ten purposes authorized by § 414: social, civic or
recreational uses (Rule 10), and use by political organizations if compliance with § 414 is
secured (Rule 8)). See generally Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692-
93 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting School District's reliance on § 414 as basis for denying access).
128 New York Educ. Law § 414 (2002); see Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386 (citing
New York Appellate Court opinion, Trietley v. Bd. of Educ. of Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1 (1978),
that ruled "local boards could not allow student bible clubs to meet on school property
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The Lamb's Chapel Church twice applied to the Center
Moriches School District for permission to use school facilities to
show a six-part film series 129 that would discuss one doctor's
"views on the undermining influences of the media that could
only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian
family values instilled at an early stage."1 30 The District denied
both requests, stating that the "film does appear to be church
related."1 31 The Church alleged violations of the Freedom of
Speech and Assembly Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and finally, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.132
The Court held that the District's refusal to allow the Church
to use school facilities to display the film series was a violation of
the Freedom of Speech Clause.133 There was no argument from
the District or the State that a film series about child rearing and
because 'religious purposes are not included in the enumerated purposes for which a
school may be used under section 414.'"); see also Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v.
Sobol, 948 F.2d 79, 84 (1991) (finding Trietley's construction of§ 414 is binding on Second
Circuit); cf Full Gospel Tabernacle v. Community Sch. Dist. 27, 979 F.Supp 214, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1997), affid 164 F.3d 829 (2d Cir. 1999) (concluding § 414 does not designate
school premises as open public forums, but instead creates limited public forum).
129 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 388, n.3 (noting film series at issue as TURN YOUR
HEART TOWARDS HOME, which included six separate films: 1) A FATHER LOOKS BACK; 2)
POWER IN PARENTING: THE YOUNG CHILD; 3) POWER IN PARENTING: THE ADOLESCENT; 4)
THE FAMILY UNDER FIRE; 5) OVERCOMING A PAINFUL CHILDHOOD; and 6) THE HERITAGE).
130 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388; see also Bronx Household, 226 F. Supp. 2d at
418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (commenting on facts, procedure and holding of Lamb's Chapel);
John S. Stolz, The Speech and the Establishment Clauses, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
1047, 1057 (1997) (explaining Lamb's Chapel in context of establishment of religion).
131 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388-89 (reviewing School District's responses to
applications: In first application, District replied "[tihis film does appear to be church
related and therefore your request must be refused," and in response to second
application, District described film series as "family oriented movie-from a Christian
perspective," again denying application). See generally Stolz, supra note 130, at 1057-58
(commenting on Lamb's Chapelin context of establishment of religion).
132 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (stating
plaintiffs causes of action); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F.
Supp. 91, 93 (E.D.N.Y 1991), rev'd 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (announcing plaintiffs basis for
lawsuit).
133 [Allthough a speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum if he wishes
to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum ... or if
he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the
forum was created.., the government violates the First Amendment when it
denies access to a speaker solely on an otherwise includible subject.
See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (finding denial of right to show film series, on basis of
its religious viewpoint, completely invalid under Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); see also M.G. "Pat" Robertson, How Much God in the
Schools?- Squeezing Religion Out of the Public Square - The Supreme Court, Lemon, and
the Myth of the Secular Society, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 251 (1995) (stating
Lamb's Chapel's holding).
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family values would not be an allowable use for social or civic
purposes. 134 Thus, there was no evidence that permission to show
the film series was denied for any reason other than for its
religious viewpoint. 135
The Court quoted Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Ed.
Fund, Ine,136 to state once again that "the government violates
the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to
suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible
subject."137 By finding viewpoint discrimination, the Court did
not address which category of public forum the district created.138
The Court addressed the School District's Establishment Clause
concerns, finding those concerns to be groundless.139 The film was
to be exhibited after school hours, open to the public, and the
school was not sponsoring the presentation.140 There was "no
realistic danger" that the District would be perceived as
endorsing religion, and any benefit gained by the Church would
be incidental. 141
134 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393 (noting "subject matter is not one that the
District has placed off limits to any and all speakers."); see also Richard M. Paul III &
Derek Rose, The Clash Between the First Amendment and Civil Rights, 60 MO. L. REV.
889, 899 (1995) (positing film would have been allowed for social or civic purpose).
135 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94 (quoting "the First Amendment forbids the
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense
of others") (citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984)); see also Saratoga Bible Training Inst. v. Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist., 18 F.
Supp. 2d 178, 186 (N.D.N.Y 1998) (stating holding of Lamb's Chapel is that religious
point of view cannot be suppressed on school grounds when other points of view on subject
are permitted); McCarthy, supra note 102, at 17 (discussing Court's finding that only
rel ious viewpoints were barred from subject matter: family values and child rearing).
473 U.S. 788 (1985).
137 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806); see also
McCarthy, supra note 102, at 17 (explaining School District unconstitutionally applied
state statute, resulting in discrimination of viewpoint of church members).
138 See McCarthy, supra note 102, at 18 (asserting "[bly finding viewpoint
discrimination, the Court did not have to elaborate on the nature of the forum created by
the government."). See generally Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 917 (10th Cir.
1997) (concluding school district in Lamb's Chapel unconstitutionally denied church's
right to show film, not because subject of film was impermissible, but because of religious
viewpoint from which subject would be taught); Airline Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't of
Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1159 (7th Cir. 1995) (claiming Lamb's Chapel was decided on
viewpoint discrimination).
139 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (comparing Lamb's Chapel to Widmar and
concluding "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think
that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed"). See generally Anderson
v. Mexican Acad. and Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 208 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(distinguishing facts at issue from Lamb's Chapel and Good News).
140 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (commenting school had frequently been used
for various private purposes).
141 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (stating the activity at issue would not violate
the Establishment Clause under the three-prong Lemon test).
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Only two years later, in Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia,142 the Court held that the University of Virginia
violated the Freedom of Speech Clause when it denied student
activity funds to a student-run newspaper because it deemed the
newspaper to be a "religious activity."143 The University had
established a limited public forum.144 The Court recognized it
may be essential for the State to restrict use of the forum "for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics" in order to
limit the forum to its intended purpose,145 however these
restrictions must be narrowly drawn to serve the purpose of the
forum, and may not discriminate based on viewpoint. 146
The Court found that the University's denial of funds was
viewpoint discrimination.147 The University had opened its forum
for a variety of student activities; religion was never excluded as
a subject matter; however, those organizations with religious
viewpoints were disfavored.14 8 Thus, the Court "observed a
distinction between on the one hand, content discrimination,
which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that
142 Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
143 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827, 836-37 (finding two dangers to First Amendment
existed in this case: "[tihe first danger lies in granting the State the power to examine
publications to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea, and if so,
for the State to classify them" and "[t]he second, and corollary danger is to speech from
the chilling of individual thought and expression."). See generally Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S 217, 233 (2000) (discussing rationale of Rosenbergerthat neutrality
in student fee program guarantees there would be no impression student newspaper
speaks for school).
144 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (commenting that, though the State chose to create
the limited public forum, viewpoint discrimination is still forbidden).
145 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (recognizing "[tihe necessities of confining a forum to
the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created may justify the State in
reserving it for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics"). See generally Chiu
v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 354-55 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting principle of
Rosenberger that states may be justified in reserving forums for certain groups to discuss
certain topics).
146 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (recognizing distinction between content
discrimination, "which may be permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited
forum," and viewpoint discrimination, "which is presumed impermissible when directed
against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations."). See generally East Timor
Action Network, Inc. v. City of N.Y., F. Supp. 2d 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting in a
limited public forum, state must narrowly draw its content-based prohibitions).
147 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (concluding "viewpoint discrimination is the
proper way to interpret the University's objections to Wide Awake."); see also id. at 829
(defining "viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination").
See generally Mangrum, supra note 12, at 1027-28 (delineating modern Supreme Court
parameters for religious viewpoint discrimination).
148 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (commenting "[rleligion may be a vast area of
inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint
from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.").
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limited forum, and, on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination,
which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech
otherwise within the forum's limitations.' 49
The Court declared that granting funding to the newspaper
would not result in an Establishment Clause violation.150 The
program of funding all organizations ensures neutrality toward
religion.151 Additionally, in order to enforce the challenged
regulation, University officials would be required to review
student publications for any underlying religious content.152
"That course of action was a denial of the right of free speech and
would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion,
which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment
Clause requires."1 53
III. GOOD NEWS CLUB V. MILFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 154
What is the Good News Club?
The Good News Club is a community-based Christian youth
organization, intended for children between the ages of six and
twelve,155 which aims to teach family and moral values from a
149 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-830 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
150 See id. at 846 (concluding "Itihere is no Establishment Clause violation in the
University's honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause."). See generally Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981) ("The University has opened its facilities for use by
student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the
content of their speech ... In this context we are unpersuaded that the primary effect of
the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, would be to advance religion).
151 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (reiterating principle of prior holdings; "[w]e have
held that the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government,
following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose
ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.") (citing Board
of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994)). See
generally Frank, supra note 50, at 1040-43 (discussing the rising emphasis on neutrality
in Establishment Clause analysis).
152 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845 (asserting "[tlhe. viewpoint discrimination
inherent in the University's regulation required public officials to scan and interpret
student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting
religious theory and belief.")
153 Id. at 845-846. But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 809 (1983) (J. Brennan,
dissenting) ("It is indeed true that there are certain tensions .. . that have shaped the
doctrine of the Establishment Clause, and required us to deviate from an absolute
adherence to separation and neutrality. Nevertheless ... the Establishment Clause gives
us no warrant simply to ... treat an unconstitutional practice as if it were
constitutional").
154 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
155 Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 202 F.3d 502, 504 (2000) (explaining
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Christian point of view. 156 It is affiliated with Child Evangelism
Fellowship (CEF), a Christian missionary organization that
provides support and supervision to Good News chapters
nationwide. 157
A typical Club meeting begins with the children reciting a
"memory verse" assigned during the previous week's meeting.158
If the child correctly recites the verse, he/she is given a prize.159
The meeting then officially opens with a prayer and singing of
the Good News Club theme song.160 The next portion of the
meeting involves a "moral or value" lesson based on a particular
biblical verse. 161 CEF provides lesson plans for use in conducting
Club meetings. 162 The Second Circuit noted that according to the
plans, "the 'teaching objective' is that 'the saved child will desire
God's best, allowing God to have first place in his life' and the
'main teaching' is to 'give God first place in your life."'163 The
lesson plan directs the instructor, when discussing the memory
verse, to distinguish between those children who are "saved" and
those who are "unsaved."164 If time permits, the group leader will
"[t]he Club takes its name from the 'good news' of Christ's gospel and the 'good news' that
salvation is available through belief in Christ."); Good News Club v. Milford Central
School, 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (1998) (commenting that the Good News Club is non-
denominational). See generally Ashley Myrick, Comment, How Can the Church Get Fit if
the Fifth Circuit Won't Let It Exercise?, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 449, 454 (2002) (describing
nature of Good News Club).
156 Good News, 202 F.3d at 504; Good News, 21 F. Supp. at 149 (noting "[tihis
support includes providing teaching materials, prayer booklets (the 'Daily Bread'), and
training, in return for which the Clubs pay a fee.").
157 GoodNews, 202 F.3d at 504.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 504-505 (explaining "[t]he meeting officially opens with a prayer led by
Reverend Stephen Douglas Fournier that gives thanks and entreats God for His blessing
on the meeting. The group then sings the Good News Club theme song, the lyrics of
which refer to Jesus Christ and are generally 'about ...good news."').
161 [Tihe children are told a Bible story that emphasizes the same moral value
that is represented in the day's memory verse. The story concludes with a
"challenge and invitation" segment, which challenges the children to live by
the value taught in the day's lesson through trust in God and Jesus Christ.
Id. at 505.
162 Id. at 505, n.3 (noting the materials from CEF contain an instructional list
entitled "How to Lead a Child to Christ", and discussing one specific lesson plan centered
around a verse from Ephesians).
163 Id .at 505; see also, Amy Rager, 'A Pharoah Who Did Not Know Joseph:" Why
Faith-Based Social Programs Should Reject Federal Funding, 70 UMKC L. REV. 385, 397
(2001) (noting the dissenters recognized this invitation to receive Jesus "crossed the line
to unprotected speech").
164 The lesson plan in court's record applies the memory verse differently to the
.saved" and "unsaved" students when they are asked to recite. The teacher will tell the
"saved" children; "if you have believed on the Lord Jesus as your Savior, one of the wisest
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share a "missionary story" and then biblical songs, games, and
prayer may follow.165 The meeting lasts approximately one
hour. 166
Milford's Refusal to Allow Good News to Use School Facilities.
In 1992, Milford Central School enacted a policy, pursuant to
NY Education Law §414, adopting seven purposes for which the
community could use its buildings.167 Two of the purposes
enacted by the District state: 1) "district residents may use the
school for 'instruction in any branch of education, learning or the
arts"'168 and, 2) "the school is available for 'social, civic and
recreational meetings and entertainment events, and other uses
pertaining to the welfare of the community, provided that such
uses shall be nonexclusive and shall be opened to the general
public."'169
The Fourniers, sponsors of the local Good News Club,
requested permission from Dr. Robert McGruder, superintendent
of the Milford Central School District, to hold the Club's weekly
meetings after school in the building.17 0 Both McGruder and
decisions you can make is to give God first place in your life. Do and say those things that
will please Him." The teacher will say to the "unsaved" children; "if you have never
believed on Jesus to save you from sin, you can be sure this is the wisest and most
important decision you will ever make. You will be given an opportunity later in class
today to believe on Jesus." "The emphasis for the 'unsaved' children is the same in all
lesson plans; to accept Jesus Christ as their savior." GoodNews, 202 F.3d at 505, n.4. For
further discussion of the unequal treatment of the "saved" and "unsaved" children. See
Gary D. Allison, Prelude to a Church-State: The Supremes Set the Stage for Faith-Based
Initiatives, 37 TULSA L.J. 111, 175-88 (2001) (providing an in-depth discussion of the
Court's decision); Peterson, supra note 93, at 259 (outlining events at a club meeting);
Leading Cases, 115 HARv. L. REv. 396, 398 (2001) (explaining how instructor taught
"saved" and "unsaved" children); The Good News Decision: Opening the School Door to
Aggressive Evangelism, Vol. 54 No. 7 CHURCH & STATE 15, 14 (2001) (showing teaching
methods at school).
165 Good News, 202 F.3d at 506 (stating a "missionary story", as described by Rev.
Fournier, is a "fictitious story that deals with some part of the world where missionary
activity is going on" and highlighting that "[alt various times throughout the meeting, the
group may pray for 'CEF missionaries' and to 'receive Jesus as a child's personal Savior.").
See generally Myrick, supra note 155, at 455 (explaining any additional meeting time was
filled with stories of missionaries or Bible stories); Scott Fallon, Bible Club Meetings in
School Cause a Stir, THE RECORD, December 13, 2001, at A01 (noting the children heard
stories about missionaries).
166 Good News, 202 F.3d at 506.
167 N.Y. Educ. Law § 414 (McKinney 2000) (allowing for the adoption of "reasonable
regulations for the use of schoolhouses.. ."); see also Good News, 533 U.S. at 102 (citing
the New York statutory provision and the schools policy enacted pursuant to it).
168 GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 102.
169 Id.
170 Good News, 533 U.S. at 103 (noting the Fourniers, as residents of the district,
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Milford's attorney reviewed the request and determined that "the
kinds of activities proposed to be engaged in by the Good News
Club were not a discussion of secular subjects such as child
rearing, development of character and development of morals
from a religious perspective, but were in fact the equivalent of
religious instruction itself."171 Soon thereafter the Milford Board
of Education adopted a resolution rejecting the Fournier's
request. 172
The Fournier's filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
that Milford violated its free speech rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, its right to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and its right to religious freedom under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.173 Both the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of New York and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that the school district did not engage in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination.174 The Supreme Court noted a conflict
were entitled to use the building for purposes approved by school officials). See generally
Peterson, supra note 93, at 259 (explaining the petition was denied because the
instruction was not moral education but religious instruction); Joan Del Fattore, 'Good
News' Makes News, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, March 27, 2001, at 3 (discussing school
officials refusal to allow the club to move meetings to the school); Kate Zernike, Court to
Hear After-School Evangelism Case, N. Y. TIMES, February 28, 2001, at Al (specifying the
refusal was based on the club's intention of utilizing the school for establishing religion).
171 This was the second rejection McGruder sent to the Club. The Fourniers first
request was formally denied by McGruder on the basis that the proposed use of "singing
songs, hearing a Bible lesson and memorizing scripture,' was 'the equivalent of religious
worship." McGruder believed the Club's activities would violate the community use policy,
which prohibits the use of school facilities for religious purposes. When confronted with a
letter from the Club's counsel, Milford's attorney requested information giving more detail
as to the character of the Club's activities. The Club sent a description of the organization
and a set of materials used during a meeting. Based on these materials, the school district
once again denied the request. Good News, 533 U.S. at 103. For other accounts of the
School Board's refusal, see Austin W. Bramwell, Juris Doctores or Doctores Divinitatis:
Good News Club v. Miford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001), 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'y 385, 386 (2001) (discussing denial of application to hold meetings); Zernike, supra
note 170, at Al (explaining refusal to allow club to use premises).
172 Good News, 533 U.S. at 104. See generally Bramwell, supra note 171, at 386
(discussing the Club's efforts to have meetings held at school).
173 Good News, 533 U.S. at 104, n.1 (remarking that the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was held unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997),
and noting the Club's claim under the Act was dismissed by the District Court). See
generally Rager, supra note 166, at 395 n.91 (noting the Supreme Court had previously
ruled the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional); Amy D. Smith,
Constitutional Law - Freedom or Religion and Establishment Clause - School Board's
Refusal to Allow Religious Groups To Meet in Public School Constitutes Unlawful
Viewpoint Discrimation Under First Amendment, 32 CuMB. L. REV. 463, 464 n.9 (2002)
(noting court dismissed the claim under the Restoration of Religious Freedom Act).
174 The District Court found the Club's "subject matter is decidedly religious in
nature, and not merely a discussion of secular matters from a religious perspective that is
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among the Courts of Appeals as to "whether speech can be
excluded from a limited public forum on the basis of the religious
nature of the speech." 75 The Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
had held that excluding speech based on its religious nature in a
limited public forum did not constitute viewpoint
discrimination,176 while the Eighth and Tenth Circuits had found
it to be unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.177 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
Majority opimon - Justice Thomas.
The Court notes that Rosenberger and Lamb's Chapel guide its
rationale; finding that the restrictions made in those cases to be
indistinguishable from that made by Milford.178 Milford opened
its facilities, a limited public forum, for organizations that
"promote the moral and character development of children"179
otherwise permitted under the District's use policies" and noted further that the District's
decision to deny access was due to "the general subject matter - religious instruction and
prayer, and not on particular perspective or viewpoint on a subject otherwise within the
forum's limitations." Good News, 21 F. Supp. at 154, 160. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding the Club's activities "[uinder even the most restrictive and archaic definitions of
religion, such subject matter is quintessentially religious." Good News, 202 F.3d at 510;
GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 104-05.
175 Good News, 533 U.S. at 105. See generally Allison, supra note 164, at 190 n.608
(2001) (noting the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve this conflict);
Peterson, supra note 93, at 259 (recognizing the split between the Second and the Eighth
Circuit).
176 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Community School Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207,
216 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding a school's refusal to permit use of building, a limited public
forum, for weekly religious worship services was constitutional); Campbell v. St.
Tammany's School Bd., 206 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding a school's policy
denying use of its limited public forum for a "prayer meeting" does not constitute
viewpoint discrimination); Gntala v. Tucson, 244 F.3d 1065, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001) (en
banc) (holding city was correct in belief that "it could not provide funding to 'events in
direct support of religious organizations'" or to a specific "Prayer Day" event without
violating the Constitution).
177 See Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1519 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding a policy closing school facilities to everyone but the Boy Scouts and
athletics from 3 to 6 p.m. on school days was unconstitutional); Church on the Rock v.
Albuquerque, 84 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding unconstitutional a city's policy
"prohibiting sectarian instruction and religious worship at its Senior Centers").
178 Good News, 533 U.S. at 106 (finding "Milford's exclusion of the Good News Club
based on its religious nature is indistinguishable from the exclusions in these
cases... [blecause the restriction is viewpoint discriminatory, we need not decide whether
it is unreasonable in light of the purposes served by the forum."). See generally Leading
Cases, supra note 164, at 399 (discussing majority's rationale).
179 Good News, 533 U.S. at 108 (stating as examples of what the community use
policy would allow: "the use of Aesop's Fables to teach children moral values," "a group
could sponsor a debate on whether there should be a constitutional amendment to permit
public education," and "the Boy Scouts could meet to influence a boy's character,
development and spiritual growth").
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and the Court found the Club clearly was such an
organization.18 0 Comparing the Good News Club with the
challenged activities in Lamb's Chapel, the Court found that the
only difference was the manner in which the Good News Club
conveyed its message; live storytelling and prayer, as opposed to
lessons taught through film.l8l "We disagree that something that
is 'quintessentially religious' or 'decidedly religious in nature'
cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals
and character development from a particular viewpoint." 8 2 The
Court held that Milford's exclusion constituted impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. 8 3
Milford raised the argument that its restriction was required
to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 8 4 In both Widmar
and Lamb's Chapel, the Court rejected similar Establishment
Clause defenses because the Court found no threat that the
community would perceive an endorsement of religion. 8 5 The
Court found that the Club's activities were indistinguishable to
those in Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, and therefore rejected
Milford's argument. 8 6
180 Good News, 533 U.S. at 108 (arguing it is undisputed the Club teaches children
how to be respectful and kind to others, even if this is done in a nonsecular way).
181 Good News, 533 U.S. at 109-10 (finding the distinction "inconsequential").
182 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch.,533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001) (citing Judge
Jacob's dissent in the Court of Appeals decision); see also Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 511-15 (2d Cir. 1999) (opining "when the subject matter is
morals and character, it is quixotic to attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints
and religious subject matters").
183 Good News, 533 U.S. at 111 (reaffirming the Court's holdings in Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger that excluding speech from a limited public forum that discusses
otherwise permissible subjects from a religious viewpoint is unconstitutional); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995) (holding
University's refusal to pay printing costs for student publication was not supported by
Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 392 (1993) (holding to exclude speech from a limited public forum that discusses
otherwise permissible subjects from a religious viewpoint is unconstitutional).
184 Good News, 533 U.S. at 112 (stating Milford's argument "that, even if its
restriction constitutes viewpoint discrimination, its interest in not violating the
Establishment Clause outweighs the Club's interest in gaining equal access to the school's
facilities.").
185 Id. at 113. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court believed the community would not
perceive school endorsement of religion because "the showing of a film serious would not
have been during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would
have been open to the public, not just church members." Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395.
In Widmar the university's facilities were already open to other groups, thus the
community would not perceive the state to be endorsing one religious activity. Good News,
533 U.S. at 113.
186 The Establishment Clause defense fares no better in this case. As in Lamb's
Chapel, the Club's meetings were held after school hours, not sponsored by
the school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent, not just
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Milford had attempted to distinguish Lamb's Chapel and
Widmar by highlighting that this situation involved elementary
school children who would feel coercive pressure to participate.18 7
The Court rejected this argument on the basis of five points.
First, an important factor when considering an attack based on
the Establishment Clause is the program's neutrality towards
religion.188 "For the 'guarantee of neutrality is respected, not
offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and
evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose
ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and
diverse."' 189 Second, the community at issue when considering
coercive pressure is not the students, but the parents.190 The
Court reasons that because the children cannot attend without
first gaining the permission of their parents, the children cannot
be coerced.191 Third, the Court has never held that the use of
school premises, outside of school hours, for religious activity is a
violation of the Establishment Clause simply because elementary
school students might be present.192 Fourth, young children
would not perceive endorsement because they are not allowed to
loiter after school, the meetings are not in an elementary
classroom, the instructors are not schoolteachers and the
children are of varying ages. 93 Fifth, the risk that young children
to Club members. As in Widmar, Milford made its forum available to other
organizations. The Club's activities are materially indistinguishable from
those in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar. Thus, Milford's reliance on the
Establishment Clause is unavailing.
GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 113.
187 GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 113.
188 Id. at 114 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 and also citing Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000), for the principle that neutrality is "upholding aid that is offered to a
broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion.").
189 Id.
190 Good News, 533 U.S. at 115 (2001) (stating the parents choose whether their
children will attend a club meeting); ef Powell v. Bunn, 185 Ore. App. 334, 364 (2002)
(finding young elementary children will not be coerced into joining the Boy Scouts because
parental consent is needed, thus the parents are the relevant community).
191 Good News, 533 U.S. at 115 (2001) (finding no reasonable argument exists that
the parents might be confused as to whether the school is endorsing religion).
192 Good News, 533 U.S. at 115-16 (rejecting Milford's argument that Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), supports the proposition that "there are heightened
concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the
elementary and secondary public schools[;]" the difference is that attendance at the
graduation exercise in Lee was mandatory, and no independent significance had been
given to the fact that the event took place on school grounds). See generally Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) (explaining the concept of coercion and the risk of
coercion).
193 GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 117-18 (2001) (finding the sum of these factors refutes any
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would view the Club's exclusion as government hostility towards
religion is as great as the risk that the Club's inclusion will be
viewed as government endorsement of religion. 194
Dissent by Justice Stevens
In his dissent, Justice Stevens divides speech into three
categories. The first "is religious speech that is simply speech
about a particular topic from a religious point of view." 195 The
second category "is religious speech that amounts to worship or
its equivalent."196 The third category "is an intermediate category
that is aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a
particular religious faith."197 Justice Stevens then posed the
question of whether a public school could constitutionally create
a limited public forum that only allowed for the first category of
religious speech. 198
Justice Stevens compares the differences between religious
viewpoint and religious proselytizing, to the differences between
meetings discussing political issues and meetings intended to
recruit new members.199 If a school were to authorize the use of
its facilities for the discussion of current events, it could not
exclude speakers with unpopular viewpoints. 200 "But must it
therefore allow organized political groups - for example, the
argument that students would perceive government endorsement of religion). But see
Anderson v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 208 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding
the existence of religious phrases on a main hallway wall would have the capacity to
cause young children to perceive some level of endorsement).
194 Good News, 533 U.S. at 118 (2001) (arguing "any bystander could conceivably be
aware of the school's use policy and its exclusion of the Good News Club, and could suffer
as much from viewpoint discrimination as elementary school children could suffer from
perceived endorsement."). See generally Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (identifying the danger of a chilling effect on perception or
ideas where a religious exercise is excluded); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972)
(explaining the suppression of ideas is dangerous and should be avoided especially in the
academic setting).
195 GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting Lamb's Chapel
is an example of this category); see also Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
196 Good News, 533 U.S. at 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting Widmar
addressed this type of speech); see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (deciding
a case on this particular type of speech).
197 GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 130 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating the more general issue is "the
constitutionality of a public school's attempt to limit the scope of a public forum it has
created").
199 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating a school "may not exclude people from
expressing their views simply because it dislikes their particular political opinions").
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Democratic Party, the Libertarian Party, or the Ku Klux Klan -
to hold meetings, the principal purpose of which is... to recruit
others to join their respective groups?"201 No - "[sluch recruiting
meetings may introduce divisiveness and tend to separate young
children into cliques that undermine the school's educational
mission."202 School officials are reasonable in viewing religious
meetings that intend to recruit children for members as a similar
risk.203 Just as a school can deny access to a political organization
intending to recruit, "so too can a school allow discussion of topics
such as moral development from a religious (or nonreligious)
perspective without thereby opening its forum to religious
proselytizing or worship."204
Justice Stevens argued that Milford created a limited public
forum in which its facilities could not be used for "religious
purposes," but this does not mean that all speech with a religious
viewpoint is excluded. 205 The school's stated purpose was to
exclude speech intended to "promote the gospel."206 The school
was attempting to create a public forum in which only the first
category of religious speech was allowed, and Justice Stevens
believed this to be constitutional as long as it was achieved
through neutral methods.2 07
IV. HAS THE COURT TAKEN ANOTHER STEP TOWARD ERADICATING
THE SEPARATION BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE?
Good News is correctly decided on purely Free Speech grounds.
However, it seems the Establishment Clause analysis is merely
an afterthought. 208 The Court has consistently held that allowing
201 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing hypothetical to Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), which upheld "a city's refusal to allow 'political advertising'
on public transportation").
203 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting "[s]chool officials may reasonably believe
that evangelical meetings designed to convert children to a particular religious faith pose
the same risk")
204 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 132 (citing to testimony of the Milford superintendent, which indicated the
community use policy would allow for teaching of theory that involved religious
principles).
206 Id.
207 Id. (acknowledging distinctions among the three categories may be difficult to
draw, but they are nonetheless valid).
208 See Barry Hankins, Is the Supreme Court hostile to religion?, J. CHURCH &
STATE, Sept. 22, 2001 at 681 (stating Court "brushed aside" the Establishment Clause
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religious speech on public property does not violate the
Establishment Clause. 209 However, it appears that this line of
decisions has led the Court to give less concern to the issue of
Establishment. As long as the speech survives Free Speech
analysis, it must be constitutional. The Court is viewing the
Establishment Clause as a threat to the religious freedom of
those organizations that choose to use public education forums,
rather than considering how the Establishment Clause is a
protection to the students. 210 By not allowing religious worship to
enter the educational setting, students are not pressured into
joining the worship, thus maintaining their right of religious
choice.21 I
Distinction between religious viewpoint and worship.
As Justice Stevens discussed in his dissent, it is not very
difficult to determine the distinction between religious viewpoint
and religious worship.212 Justice Stevens reasoning agrees with
that of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit in Bronx Household
of Faith v. Community School District No. 10213 where the court
declared that it is not difficult for school officials to make the
distinction between religious worship and religious viewpoint. 2 14
arguments); Bernard James & Stephen O'Dell, The 'Good News'Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
6, 2001 at CIO (criticizing Court for leaving Establishment Clause issue open); Martin E.
Karlinsky, 'Milford Is About Free Speech,' N.Y.L.J., July 5, 2001 at 2 (characterizing
Court's Establishment Clause findings as "purely dicta").
209 See supra notes 102-53, 178-94 and accompanying text.
210 See Karlinsky, supra note 208 ("The Establishment Clause is not a barrier to
religion, rather it is its greatest ally"). See generally Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (stating that minimum protection offered by Establishment Clause is
to be free from forced belief or disbelief in religion); Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to
Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147,
la225 (2002) (noting "the school's responsibility to ensure listeners are not coerced to
affirm beliefs they do not share" under Establishment Clause).
211 See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 261 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that in educational settings "the line between voluntary
and coerced participation may be difficult to draw); Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (commenting that school is
most important forum to exclude religion). See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
581-99 (1992) (discussing Coercion test).
212 Good News Club v. Milford, 533 U.S. 98, 131-33 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Charles Levendosky, Good News Club's Win at High Court Bad News, FIRST AMENDMENT
CYBER-TRIBUNE, available at http://w3.trib.com/FACT/lst.lev.sctongoodnewsclub.html
(June 17, 2001) (stating "[r]eligious worship is easily distinguishable from teaching
morals from a religious perspective").
213 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
214 The District apparently has been prepared to allow the use of its premises
for the discussion of religious material in a secular setting and to allow the
2003]
384 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:347
This court and other lower courts have drawn this distinction to
allow community groups to use public facilities for the discussion
of religious topics but not to allow them to use public schools for
religious worship.215
The majority's analysis relies heavily on Lamb's Chapel.216
However, it is suggested, the Court failed to make a critical
comparison between the activities at issue in Lamb's Chapel and
those at issue in Good News. If the Court had done so, it would
have seen that the activities at issue in Good News were geared
more towards religious recruitment and worship than religious
viewpoint. The activity challenged in Lamb's Chapel was the
showing of a film series.217 This activity required a very passive
role of those participating.218 It seems that those viewing the
video were free to leave and enter as they please.219 Those
watching the video were not all members of any one organization;
they were not compelled to pledge their devotion to Christianity
while participating.220 Those participating were only required to
discussion of secular matters from a religious viewpoint.. .The distinction
between these uses on the one hand, and religious services and instruction on
the other, is not difficult for school authorities to make.
Id. at 215.
215 The distinction, between prohibiting religious services and prohibiting
religious expression from a religious viewpoint, is no more conceptually
difficult than the distinction between prohibiting picketing and prohibiting
all picketing except that which bears on a labor dispute. A religious service is
an activity, a manner of communicating which carries a very special and
distinct meaning in our culture. While a service may express a religious
viewpoint, for example, a Catholic mass featuring a prayer for the welfare of
the unborn and for the reform of American abortion law, the distinction is
between medium and message.
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 943 (5th Cir. 2000); Deboer v.
Village of Oak Park, 86 F. Supp. 2d 804, 810-11 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (asserting "[pirayer and
prayer services are distinctly different in nature from other forms of expression, not just
because of the manner in which - or the viewpoint from which - the speaker's thoughts
are expressed, but also in the substance of the expression"). See generally Martha P.
McCarthy, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Cracks in Wall Between Church &
State, EDUCATION UPDATE ONLINE (July 2001), available at
http://www.educationupdate.com/july0l/htmls/law-goodnews.html (opining under Good
News ruling, once public school establishes a limited public forum it cannot exclude
religious groups, even if their meetings are intend to proselytize students).
216 See Good News, 533 U.S. at 106-10 (noting Lamb's Chapel is one of two prior
opinions guiding the Court's current analysis).
217 Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387.
218 See id. at 387-88 (discussing the Church's request to display the film series);
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 383-84 (2d Cir.
1992) (noting the Church's requested use of the school was to allow the community to
view the film series free of charge).
219 SeeLamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 387-88.
220 See McCarthy, supra note 102, at 26 (opining "it can be argued that the
controversial film series in Lamb's Chapel entailed primarily the expression of religious
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sit back and watch. Significant also, is that the requested time to
display the film series was in the evening; 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. 221
Students could not perceive the display of the film series as
inclusive in the school curriculum.
In Good News, the activity required much more active
involvement from those participating. Students were expected to
contribute by memorizing bible verses and singing songs. 222 The
students also played games and received prizes during this
time.223 The students were asked to pledge their devotion to
Christianity. 224 The non-Christian child in the school gets ready
to leave school at the end of the day as he watches his friends run
to what appears to be playtime. 225 This one child will feel left out
of the fun. The majority concluded that the young age of the
children would not lead to any requirement for special protection
under the Establishment Clause.226 Apparently the six Justices
of the majority have forgotten what it was like to be young -
when being left out of the group was the worst thing that could
happen in the world.
Another notable distinction between Lamb's Chapel and Good
News is the audience to which the challenged activity is directed.
The videos in Lamb's Chapel were intended to appeal to both the
perspectives on secular subjects, whereas the club meetings involve more religious
instruction and worship"). Compare id. at 395 (highlighting the film series was not
limited to Church members., rather the entire community was welcome to attend), with
Good News, 202 F.3d at 505, n.4 (discussing lesson plan of Good News Club which
distinguishes between the "saved" children who have "believed on the Lord Jesus as
[their] Savior" and the "unsaved" children, who are further encouraged "to accept Jesus
Christ as their savior").
221 Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 384.
222 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001).
223 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 506 (2d Cir. 2000).
224 See id. at 505 (distinguishing treatment of the "saved" versus the "unsaved"
students).
225 See Karlinsky, supra note 208 (questioning the Court's reasoning that young
children are not at risk of perceiving a state endorsement of religion because they will be
able to distinguish between what they learn before and after the school bell rings). See
generally Board of Education of Community School v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990)
(conceding students may feel religious pressure if a religious club were allowed to operate
on school grounds); Kathleen Dolegowski, Religious Club Files Suit After School Denies
Access to Property, LAWYERS JOURNAL, August 10, 2001 (discussing the Court's reasoning
that children would not feel pressure to attend the after school program).
226 [Wlhatever significance we may have assigned in the Establishment Clause
context to the suggestion that elementary school children are more
impressionable than adults, we have never extended our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence to foreclose private religious conduct during nonschool
hours merely because it takes place on school premises where elementary
school children may be present.
GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 115.
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current students and also other members of the community; this
is evidenced by the fact that one video, dealing with the effects of
governmental interference, abortion, and pornography, was not
recommended for young audiences.227 However, the challenged
activity in Good News was intended only for young children.228 A
member of the community could see this as a government
endorsement of religion because only students are targeted.
Nonetheless, the Court in Good News did not critically address
the distinction between religious viewpoint and religious
worship. 229  It remains unclear whether an organization
conducting religious worship in a public forum would lead to an
Establishment Clause violation.2 30 It appears that under this
ruling, a public school that opens itself for community use cannot
bar religious groups, even if the purpose of using the school is to
recruit students for membership.231
227 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. 384, 389, n.3 (1983) (discussing video number 4,
"The Family Under Fire," which contained the following warning "Note: This film
contains explicit information regarding the pornography industry Not recommended for
young audiences."); Lamb's Chapel, 959 F.2d at 383-84 (discussing repeatedly that the
Church intended the film series to be open to the entire community).
228 See GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 103 (noting the Club is intended for children ages 6 to
12); McCarthy, supra note 102, at 26 (distinguishing the target audience in Lamb's
Chapel from that in Good News).
229 Despite Milford's insistence that the Club's activities constitute "religious
worship," the Court of Appeals made no such determination. It did compare
the Club's activities to "religious worship," but ultimately it concluded merely
that the Club's activities "fall outside the bounds of pure 'moral and character
development.'" In any event, we conclude that the Club's activities do not
constitute mere religious worship, divorced of any teaching of moral values.
Good News, 533 U.S. at 112, n.4 (citations omitted). See Levendosky, supra note 212,
(arguing the majority improperly focused on viewpoint when it should have been
concerned with the content of the speech); see also Eugene R. Barnosky, Outside Counsel:
'Good News' May be Bad News for School Officials, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 20, 2001 (commenting
tension remains between the free speech rights of these religious organizations and the
Establishment Clause concerns of school officials, and opining litigation may ensue
because the Good News decision blurred "[tlhe thin line between the activity of teaching
values to children from a Christian perspective and the repetition of biblical verses").
230 See Barnosky, supra note 229 (discussing argument of some religious advocates
that "the strong language of the majority may make it difficult to deny any religious
activity, including mass or other Sabbath services, if a district opens has opened its forum
to secular users who conduct discourse on moral issues"); see also Speech or Worship'
The High Court Blurs the Line in a School Case, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, June 15,
2001, at A16 (posing question, "[miust public schools that offer their facilities for
community forums also agree to play host to religious services - not just an evangelical
Protestant prayer meeting but Jewish Seder or a Catholic High Mass?"). See generally
David C. Slade, Christian Clubs in Public Schools; BriefArticle, WORLD & I, Sept. 1, 2001
at 54 (commenting the distinction between viewpoint and proselytizing is going to became
the focus of public debate).
231 See Good News, 533 U.S. at 131-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing
religious recruitment/proselytizing from the mere discussion of topics from a religious
viewpoint); McCarthy, supra note 215 (criticizing Court's eradication of "the distinction
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Children must be protected from efforts to proselytize.232 The
students are of a very young age; easily impressionable. Even if
the parents of these students did not consider this activity to be
endorsement by the school district, the parents should not be our
only concern. The students are the ones immersed in the
environment; an environment in which they are required to take
part unless their parents are willing and able to tender the
money for a private school education. One commentator has
suggested that the Supreme Court has replaced the "wall of
separation" with a "school bell of separation."233 The timing of the
activities, just moments after the end of instruction, could give
the impression to young children that this is part of the school
day.234
Supporters of the Good News decision cite to the Board of
between religious viewpoints and worship that some lower courts had drawn").
232 See Press Release, ADL Says Supreme Court Decision is a Setback for Church-
State Separation, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, available at
http://www.adl.org./PresRele/rel-chstsep-90/3859_90.asp (June 11, 2001) (quoting
Abraham H. Foxman, Anti-Defamation League National Director; "[clhildren must be
protected from efforts to proselytize in the schools, and this ruling substantially limits
such protection"). See generally Karlinsky, supra note 208 (opining the Good News
decision extinguishes the Establishment Clause rights of children; rights which should
protect the child from the recruitment efforts of religious organizations while at school).
But see John F. Dunsford, A Closer Look at Good News v. Milford: What are the
Implications (Stay Tuned), 25 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 577, 607 (2002) (suggesting Good News'
implications on the Establishment Clause debate are narrow).
233 Sammie Moshenberg, Top-Court Decision Fuels Efforts to 'Chistiamze' KIds,
JEWISH BULLETIN OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, available at
http://www.jewishsf.com/bkOlO622/comml.shtml (last visited March 7, 2003) (opining the
Good News decision replaces the "wall of separation" with a "school bell of separation;"
there is no true separation when official classroom instruction and "explicit religious
proselytizing" are separated by mere minutes).
234 See Good News, 533 U.S. at 144-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("there is a good case
that Good News's exercises blur the line between public classroom instruction and private
religions indoctrination, leaving a reasonable elementary school pupil unable to
appreciate that the former instruction is the business of the school while the latter
evangelism is not"); Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 265-67 (1990) (Marshall, J. concurring in judgment) (commenting that religious
clubs at school will convey the erroneous message that the school is endorsing, rather
than tolerating, student worship); see also Press Release, Civil Rights Group Decries High
Court's Ruling on Religious Groups in Public Schools, PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY,
available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid+1676 (June 11, 2001)
(opining there is a risk that students will perceive school endorsement of Christianity
when the Club is allowed to hold a meeting immediately after the end of the school day);
Press Release, National School Boards Association Disappointed in High Court's Decision
to Give Religious Clubs Access to Public Schools, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS
ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.nsba.orgsite/doc.asp?TracklD=&SID=1&DID=5500&CID=225&VID=2 (June
11, 2001), (stating National School Boards Association is "very concerned now about the
ability of school board members to prevent confusion among students about the academic
education taking place during school hours and the worship services right afterwards").
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Education v. Mergen 235 upholding the Equal Access Act. 236 What
is distinct about the Equal Access Act is that it applies to only
public secondary schools.237 Milford argued "that Congress had
recognized the vulnerability of elementary school children to
misperceiving endorsement of religion."238 The Court rejected
this argument; "The Act, however, makes no express recognition
of the impressionability of elementary school children. It applies
only to public secondary schools and makes no mention of
elementary schools. We can derive no meaning from the choice by
Congress not to address elementary schools."239
Though the Court rejects the view that Congress has
recognized the vulnerability of young children, Mergens is still
inapplicable to our analysis of Good News. The Mergens Court
found that the Equal Access Act protects religious speech; even
stating that it satisfied the secular prong of the Lemon Test.240
This note finds that the Court in Good News failed to observe the
distinction between religious speech and religious worship. As
noted in Bronx Household, it is not difficult to make the
distinction between the discussion of secular subjects from a
religious viewpoint and religious services. 241 It appears evident
235 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
236 See Craig, supra note 41, at 557 (asserting no argument exists which justifies the
exclusion of elementary schools from coverage under the Equal Access Act); see also
Davis, supra note 10, at 234 n.62 (noting the original draft of the Equal Access Act would
have encompassed elementary schools). See generally Leah Gallant Morgenstein, Note:
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens: Three 'R'"+ Rehlgon =
Mergens, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 240 n.98 (1991) (discussing Tenth Circuit's holding
enjoining religious groups from meeting at public elementary school).
237 See 20 U.S.C.S. §4071(a); see also Board of Education of Westside Community
Schools, 496 U.S. at 241 (noting Equal Access Act only applies to public secondary schools
receiving federal financial assistance). See generally Philip C. Kissam, Essay: Let's Bring
Religion into the Pubhc Schools and Respect the Religion Clauses, 49 KAN. L. REV. 593,
624 (2001) (commenting Equal Access Act establishes a limited open forum for non-
curriculum related groups in public secondary schools receiving federal financial
assistance).
238 See GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 118, n.8.
239 Id.
240 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (finding "the Act's prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of 'political, philosophical, or other' speech as well as religious speech is a sufficient
basis for meeting the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test"); 20 U.S.C.S. §4071(a)
(declaring unlawful a school's discrimination on the basis of religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of speech).
241 Bronx Household, 127 F.3d at 215 (asserting it is not difficult for school officials to
make the distinction between the discussion of secular subjects with a religious viewpoint
and religious services). See generally Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 759
n.21 (1976) (quoting from Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)) ("evidence shows
institutions with admittedly religious functions but whose predominant higher education
mission is to provide their students with a secular education"). But see Barry W. Ashe,
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that if one is required to memorize bible verses, join in prayer,
and asked to pledge devotion to Christianity while participating
in an organization's meeting, the activity can no longer be
considered mere discussion from a religious viewpoint. It appears
the only factor that differentiates this activity from a Sunday-
School lesson in the local church is the actual church itself; this
is religious worship. As religious worship, the activity cannot
seek the protection of the Equal Access Act as upheld in
Mergens.
What is most disappointing about this decision is that the
Supreme Court is viewing the Establishment Clause as a threat
to the religious freedom of organizations such as the Good News
Club.242 The Clause prevents any one religion from being
disfavored because the government has chosen to endorse
another.4 3 To oppose religious worship in schools is not to be
hostile to all things religious.244 There is a difference between
religious viewpoint and religious worship.
By protecting the right to speak with a religious viewpoint in
public forums, we allow for the dissemination of various ideas
throughout our society. 245 However, it is important to realize that
Fifth Circuit Symposium: Constitutional Law: The Fith Circuit's War Against Religion in
the Public Square, 46 LOY. L. REV. 973, 1025 (2000) (noting some commentators felt the
2,d Circuit's decision in Bronx Household strayed from the Court's line of precedent since
Widmar).
242 See generallyKarlinsky, supra note 208 (opining "the Establishment Clause is not
a barrier to religion"); Rezai,, supra note 41, at 510 n.35 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)) (commenting the Establishment Clause was meant to
place freedom of religion out of majority control).
243 But see Cheryl Saunders, Religion and Constitutional Rights: Comment: Religion
and the State, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1300-01 (2000) (suggesting separation of religion
and state might not solve the problem of religious persecution in a multicultural
community). See generally Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 821-22 (1983) (arguing
separation of religion and state does not rob the nation of its spiritual identity);
Karlinsky, supra note 208 (explaining separation of religion and state "ensures that
America's religious institutions are healthy, vital and the strongest worldwide").
244 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating majority opinion "bristles with hostility to all things religious in
public life" and is contrary to the spirit of the Establishment Clause); see also Karlinsky,
supra note 208 (clarifying "[tlo ppose those who would increase the role of religion in
government is not to be irreligious... Instead, it is a recognition that the Establishment
Clause has been a key to the success of religion in America."). But see Gilbert A. Holmes,
Article: Student Relgious Expression in School: Is it Religion or Speech, and Does it
Matter, 49 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 377, 409-10 (1994) (suggesting prohibition of religious
expression in schools by the state may appear as state opposition to religion).
245 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 122
S.Ct. 2080, 2087 (2002) (commenting freedom of religion within the public forum has been
historically important for the dissemination of ideas). See generally Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 502-05 (1946) (finding a town may not restrict religious speech in public,
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the state is not discriminating against religion by declining to
allow religious worship on its property.246 We are free in this
country to practice whatever religion we choose, but when
worship enters a public forum we lose a certain portion of that
freedom because the independence of our decision is now tainted
with social pressure to participate. 247 Justice O'Connor has
recognized that allowing religious worship in the public forum
would inevitably allow for benefits to a few religions and the
possible creation of political alliances along religious lines.2 48
Worst of all, she notes, it could interfere with the independence
of religious institutions because of unneeded entanglement with
the state. 249 Keeping worship out of our public lives ensures the
vitality of all religions in this country.250
even if the town be company-owned, because restriction would curtail the dissemination
of ideas); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 422 (1943) (stating restriction upon the right to
disseminate ideas to the public abridges the freedom of religion).
246 See Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46
MERCER L. REV. 1123, 1128 (1995) (commenting "school prayer proponents still adhere to
the long rejected notion that denying a governmental role in religious worship amounts to
hostility to religion"). See generally Karlinsky, supra note 208 (describing the
Establishment Clause as religion's "greatest ally").
247 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587 (opining "[t]he Constitution guarantees that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise"); Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687-88 (expressing concern about message endorsement sends to nonadherents);
see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc., 122 S.Ct. at 2094-96
(Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (comparing the freedom of religious speech in a public forum
and on personal private property). See generally United States Postal Service v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 144 (1981) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (noting
freedom of speech can be curtailed by a town if the speech has a religious character).
248 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (commenting "excessive
entanglement with religious institutions... [may] give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of religion, and
foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious line"); see, e.g Larkin
v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 459 U.S. 116, 126 (1982) (explaining purpose of Establishment
clause is to ensure separation of church and state); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp 374
U.S. 203, 208 (1963) (stating separation of church and state is necessary).
249 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (opining "excessive entanglement with religious
institutions... may interfere with the independence of the institutions"). See generally
Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127 (stating statutes which entangle church and state are highly
offensive to the constitution); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203, 207 (1963)
(arguing Constitution requires free exercise of religion).
250 See Karlinsky, supra note 208 ("By protecting religion from the state and state
from religion, and by making sure that they do not mix either in a school room or where
social services are delivered, the Establishment Clause ensures that America's religious
institutions are healthy, vital and the strongest worldwide. The Establishment Clause
has been a key factor in ensuring that religion in this country thrives"). See generally
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (stating "[tlhe Establishment Clause's] first and
most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion").
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The Good News Court's analysis of the Endorsement and
Coercion tests.
The Endorsement Test.
While briefly acknowledging the Endorsement test, the Court
strikes it down as applied to Good News. 251 The Court lays out
certain facts as support: students are not allowed to linger in the
building at the end of the day,252 young children are aware of
which events require permission from a parent, 53 the meetings
are not held in an elementary school classroom,254 the instructors
are not schoolteachers, 255 and the children attending a Club
meeting are of varying ages, which is a departure from the
normal classroom setting.25 6 For all these reasons, the Court
finds no support for the argument that young children would
perceive endorsement. 57
A flaw with the Court's first argument, that no children are
allowed to loiter after school, is that it disregards the fact that
these meetings are taking place immediately at the end of the
school day.258 A student who is still gathering his/her belongings
could observe what is occurring in the classroom. The court also
251 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 117-19 (2001). See
generally Bauchman for Bauchman v. West High School 132 F.3d 542, 552 (10th Cir.
1997) (stating the endorsement test is now generally accepted as the leading framework
for analyzing Establishment Clause claims); James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, A
Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as the Establishment Clause
Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 674-677 (1990) (suggesting that even among
Justices on the Court who have adopted the endorsement test, there is no unanimity on
how it should be applied).
252 Good News, 533 U.S. at 117 (stating facts to support Court's opinion that students






258 See Civil Rights Group Decries High Court's Ruling on Rehlious Groups in Public
Schools, supra note 246 (arguing students may perceive endorsement due to the timing of
the activity); see also Moshenberg, supra note 233 (opining no true separation exists when
the religious activity is beginning only minutes after official school activities end). See
generally Levendosky, supra note 212 (noting Club's position that only students with
written permission of their parents may participate, but questioning that position because
the Club requested use of the school to take advantage of the fact that their meeting could
have continuity with the school day).
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does not address the likelihood that other after school activities
could be taking place, for which other students would remain
present in the building to attend.
Does the fact that the meeting occurred in a classroom used by
middle and high school students really change the message the
activity sends to the younger students? All of these students
attend classes in this building - the location of the particular
classroom will not change the perception of the younger students.
What will have a stronger influence on the students is that their
fellow classmates are attending this meeting.
The Court's focus on the permission slips is bewildering. The
Court's rationale is that an elementary school student would not
perceive endorsement of the activity because it is required to
receive the permission of the parents to attend the activity.259
Can one then conclude that the school district is not supporting
the other various activities for which permission slips are
required? When the class takes a trip to the zoo, is the school not
supportive of the educational message of that trip. The
permission slips could be considered evidence that the school is
not attempting to coerce the students into attending the Club's
meetings, but the use of permission slips does not prevent the
risk students will perceive an endorsement of religion.
The Court directed little effort to applying the Endorsement
test, and thus failed to apply it properly. The Court failed to take
a serious look at the objective message the activity sends to the
students in the school, instead it used five facts to support its
pre-determined conclusion that no student would perceive
endorsement. 260 It appears that Justice O'Connor has become
willing to accept a weak Endorsement test analysis rather than
259 See Good News, 533 U.S. at 117-18 (asserting "Islurely even young children are
aware of events for which their parents must sign permission forms"); see also Brown,
supra note 14, at 278 (observing the Court's misplaced emphasis on the permission slip
requirement in its Establishment Clause analysis is due to the Court's focus on the
parents' perceptions instead of the students.' "After determining the parents as the
relevant community, the Court cites [Lee v. Weisman ] in support of its finding that it is
these same parents and their perceptions and sense of coercion that is relevant, not their
children's perceptions. The holding in Lee is contrary to this finding."). See generally id.
at 280-82 (stating that in finding the permission slip dispositive, the Court in Good News
ignored the likely possibility that many parents will fail to read the permission slips that
their children give them and choose to simply sign them. When this happens, the
children may not have any guidance or explanation about religious clubs such as Good
News).
260 See Good News 533 U.S. at 117-18.
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none at all. 261
The Court's use of the Endorsement test also reveals a
shortcoming in the test. O'Connor's test supplies little guidance
on how to define the relevant community.262 By giving little
direction, O'Connor allows the test to be manipulated by the
Court as a means to reach desired ends. The Court's arguments
appear as if the Court views the relevant community to be the
school itself. Should we only be concerned with how the students
objectively perceive the challenged activity? The factors the
Court uses to determine that students would not perceive
endorsement are inapplicable when considering the viewpoint of
the parents. 263 It is insignificant to the parents that the
instructors are not schoolteachers or that the meetings are held
in a classroom where their child does not receive instruction. The
Club is attempting to proselytize students into following the
Club's religious beliefs through meetings that are held
immediately after the end of the school day.264 The parents could
believe that the school, by hosting such activity, is endorsing the
efforts of the Club and further, that the school is favoring those
students who do participate. 265 The use of permission slips is not
261 See Good News, 533 U.S. at 117 (applying Endorsement test to Good News). See
generally Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a
Constitutional Variable, 47 VAND. L. REV. 273, 338 (1994) (agreeing Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test raises problems of perspective); Lewis & Vild, supra note 251 (stating
although still the law, the endorsement analysis is plagued with the problem of
perspective - from whose perspective should the endorsement analysis be applied: an
objective perspective, subjective, or a reasonable person's?).
262 See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (declaring "the reasonable
observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of
the jmmmunity and forum in which the religious display appear").
See supra text accompanying notes 252-57.
264 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 144 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing the Club
actually requested access to the school at 2:30 p.m. in order to begin the religious
instruction promptly at 3 p.m. and stating "the temporal and physical continuity of Good
News's meetings with the regular school routine seems to be the whole point of using the
school"); see also Karlinsky, supra note 208 (arguing it is difficult to determine when the
school day ends and the Good News meeting begins). See generally Bradley Sanders,
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Speech Discussing Otherwise Permissible
Subjects Cannot Be Excluded From a Limited Public Forum on the Ground that the
Subject is Discussed From a Relbous Point of View, 71 MiSS. L.J. 305, 323 (2001)
(arguing the recent First Amendment Court decisions now place upon schools the
hopeless task of distinguishing between organizations that teach secular subjects from a
religious viewpoint from distinctly religious organizations).
265 See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[e]ndorsement sends a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.").
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sufficient to thwart this message of endorsement. 266
The Coercion Test
The majority in Good News addressed Justice Kennedy's test,
asking, "whether the community would feel coercive pressure to
engage in the Club's activities."267 The Court stated that the
relevant community is the parents, not the students.2 68 Due to
the use of permission slips, the parents made the choice of
whether their children will attend Club meetings.269 "Because the
children cannot attend without their parents' permission, they
cannot be coerced into engaging in the Good News Club's
religious activities. "270
There are two flaws within the Court's reasoning. The first is
the idea that the students cannot be coerced in this situation
because of the use of permission slips. The use of permission slips
is evidence to support that the school is not trying to coerce the
students, but it is not dispositive. It seems odd that the child
must actually join before that child is considered to have been
coerced. Isn't it possible to be coercing someone to do something
before they actually do it? A child can have felt the pressure of
coercion without actually having joined the Club.
The second flaw with the Court's reasoning is that it
designated the parents as the relevant community. The coercion
test does not necessitate the Court select a relevant community;
the test, as originally laid out, focused on the students and is to
be applied only to the students.271 "The inquiry with respect to
266 See Karlinsky, supra note 208 (commenting use of permission slips is necessary,
but it is not enough to "purge the taint" of what is otherwise a clear Establishment Clause
violation); see also Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. Of Education of NY, 226 F. Supp. 2d
401, 425 (2002) (showing parental consent was but one element used to see if the
Establishment Clause was violated); see cf Anderson v. Mexican Academy and Central
School, 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 208 (2002) (explaining the court must look at other factors
aside from parental consent).




271 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992) (focusing the attention of the
analysis on the position of the students, both those who participated in the prayer, and
the student who did not); see also Mergens, 496 U.S. at 260-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(concluding the Equal Access Act is consistent with the standard of coercion because it
does not authorize school authorities to require or encourage students to become members
of the religious club or to attend club meetings); see cf Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 886 F.
Supp. 1374, 1383 (1995) (showing coercion exists when one is forced to participate in a
religious activity).
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coercion must be whether the government imposes pressure upon
a student to participate in a religious activity."272 The parents
would not feel pressure to join the Club because they are not
attending the school. The Club is holding its meetings in the
school community, and the students are going to feel the effects
of any pressure to take place in religious activities. It appears the
Court used the parents as the relevant community because it is
easier to argue that no coercion exists when considered from the
viewpoint of the parents. The parents are removed from the
school- itself; it is logical to conclude little coercion will be felt.
The Court's application of the parents as the relevant community
contradicts its analysis under the Endorsement test, where the
Court indicated the students were the relevant community. It
appears the Court is using whichever community will lead to the
desired end. This factor serves as additional evidence that the
Establishment Clause analysis of this case is illusory.
The Court in Good News gave little effort to discussing the
Coercion test, similar to the treatment the Endorsement test
received. If the Court continues to reject existing Establishment
Clause tests, the question must be asked; how do we determine if
an Establishment Clause violation has occurred? The Lemon test
remains applicable law, but it is questionable how much longer it
will survive because of the criticism of its utility.273 Soon, there
will be no tests to apply. Once the challenged speech survives
Free Speech analysis, it will be constitutional. It appears that the
Court is leading towards turning the Establishment Clause into
a nullity when involving religious speech.
V. COULD THE COURT'S DECISION ACTUALLY INJURE
ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS GOOD NEWS MORE THAN IT HAS HELPED?
Current Milford Superintendent Peter Livshin has commented
that three options remain for the District; "1. allow the Good
News Club, and all clubs, to use school facilities right after
272 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 261 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting "[this inquiry, of
course, must be undertaken with sensitivity to the special circumstances that exist in a
secondary school where the line between voluntary and coerced participation may be
difficult to draw"). See generallyChaudhuri, 886 F. Supp. at 83 (asserting a plaintiff must
show they were coerced into participating in a religious activity); Tanford v. Brand, 883 F.
Supp. 1231, 1239 (1995) (explaining how real the pressure students feel is).
273 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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school; 2. bar all clubs from meeting at school facilities; or 3.
allow clubs only after a certain time such as 5 o'clock." 274 In
Orange County, California, the Saddleback Valley United School
District opted for option number two - choosing to ban all
student groups from campus rather than admit the Fellowship of
Christian Athletes student group.2 75 How many school districts
will follow lead? School officials may be reluctant to release
control over what the students hear on the property after the
school day ends, opting to refuse any after-school activity rather
than appearing to foster proselytizing among young students.276
This appears to have an effect opposite of that intended by the
six justices in the majority. The Court may learn "that while
Good News may make good law, it does not necessarily make
good policy when attempting to manage a limited public
forum."2 7
7
Since the Good News decision, an additional concern has
274 Heather Koerner, Good News, Indeed, CITIZEN MAGAZINE (2001), available at
http://www.family.org/cforumlcitizenmag/features/a0017343.html (commenting Livshin
hopes the school board will choose option number three, so the Club can only meet when
children have left the school after completion of the day's instruction); see Richard W.
Garnett, Article: The Right Questions About School Choice: Education, Reigious
Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1281, 1298 (2002) (explaining an
affect of more options); see also Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics and
The Privatization of Religion, 42 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 771, 790 (2001) (commenting
on the usage of school facilities).
275 See John C. Eastman, Bad New for Good News Clubs ASHBROOK CENTER FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS (July 2001), available at
http://www.ashbrook.org/publicatloped/eastman/01lgoodnews.html. (opining the Good
News decision is bad news for all student organizations); John H. Garvey, Symposium: A
Religious Equality Amendment ?" All Things Being Equal..., 1196 BYU L. REV. 587, 591
(1996) (showing decision's affect on numerous issues); see cf Martha McCarthy, Religion
and Education: Whnither the Establishment Clause, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 132 (2000) (opining
that allowing one group to use the facilities will affect a decision to allow other groups use
of the facility in the future).
276 See Speech or Worship, The High Court Blurs the Line in a School Case, supra
note 230 (stating the Good News ruling "could have the ironic effect of curbing free
speech, by persuading school officials to close their facilities to any after-hours forums
rather than risk the divisiveness of seeming to foster proselytizing among very young
children"); see also Koerner, supra note 274 (discussing Milford Superintendent Livshin's
preference to only allow clubs to meet only after a certain time so that children are clear
that the activity is not part of the school curriculum). See generally Sundwall, supra note
12, at 188 (suggesting the Good News decision may actually harm religion because school
districts may eliminate all clubs from meeting on their grounds in order prevent religious
groups from having access).
277 James & O'Dell, supra note 208, at C10 (arguing further, "[tihe coordination and
monitoring necessary for the initial authorization and ongoing compliance of expressive
groups may contend with the underlying educational mission"). See generally Anderson,
186 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (explaining limited public forums); Allison, supra note 164, at 114
(explaining the Supreme Court will never accept an Establishment Clause justification for
excluding a religious speaker from a limited public forum).
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surfaced: Does every club in creation have right to access to
public schools? 278 Milford Superintendent Livshin asked "Do I
have the right to deny a local chapter of the Ku Klux Klan or the
Wiccans from using the school?"279 Superintendent Livshin raises
a very important concern; does this ruling require school officials
to give equal access rights to religious groups who base their
religions in hate?28 0 The neutrality principle that is the
foundation of the modern day approach to the Establishment
Clause makes it impossible for school officials to make these
distinctions. 281
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in Good News correctly decided the case on pure
Free Speech grounds, however the Establishment Clause
analysis is merely an afterthought. The Court's decisions dealing
with religious activities in public education have led to the point
where the Court gives little concern to the issue of
Establishment. Soon the Establishment Clause will cease to play
any role in public education. Lower court decisions, prior to Good
News, made the determination of whether the challenged activity
violated the Establishment Clause based on the distinction
between religious viewpoint and religious worship. The Court in
Good News failed to critically address this distinction, and as a
278 See Eastman, supra note 275 (arguing a multitude of other organizations will
seek access to the school's facilities claiming their meetings serve a benefit to the
community). See generally Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McAllister, Article: An Eagle
Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223, 236
(1997) (explaining what permitted usage is); Smith, supra note 173, at 471 (explaining
usage must be nonexclusive and open to the general public).
279 Koerner, supra note 274.
280 It is certainly unclear as to whether a district has a right to limit hateful
religious speech or extremist rhetoric directed at the children, especially if
that hateful speech originates from a theology of hatred, such as those
professed by Hale's World Church of the Creator, Farrakhan's Nation of
Islam or the more benign-sounding (but no less hateful) Christian Identity
movement.
Karlinsky, supra note 208; see Broberg, supra note 29, at 99 (showing why hate groups
may be permitted to meet on school campuses); see also Morgenstein, supra note 236, at
222 (commenting once an open forum is created a school may not deny access)
281 See generally Speech or Worzshp " The High Court Blurs the Line In a School
Case, supra note 230 (arguing school officials may choose to close facilities to all
organizations rather than make this difficult distinction). But see Deborah M. Brown,
Notes: The States, The Schools and the Bible: The Equal Access Act and State
Constitutional Law 43 CASE W. RES. 1021, 1058 (1993) (showing student groups that are
unlawful can be excluded).
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result school officials are unclear about whether they can exclude
religious worship from their facilities.
